Great American Insurance Co. v. Heneghan Wrecking & Excavating Co.
46 N.E.3d 859
Ill. App. Ct.2016Background
- A fire on Aug. 24, 2006 at the Wirt Dexter building (630 S. Wabash) left its exterior walls freestanding and the structure hazardous. The City obtained a court order for emergency demolition.
- The City contracted Heneghan Wrecking and Concord Construction to demolish the building on Oct. 25–26, 2006; during demolition the north wall collapsed and damaged neighboring properties (notably 600 and 632 S. Wabash).
- Insurers (as subrogees) and the Estate sued defendants asserting common-law and statutory strict liability and negligence; the Estate asserted negligence and strict liability against Heneghan for damage to 632.
- The trial court granted partial summary judgment for Heneghan and Concord on common-law strict liability (finding demolition was not ultrahazardous under Restatement §520 factors), denied summary judgment on negligence issues, and later granted the City’s motion in limine barring the jury from seeing the municipal statutory strict-liability claim (65 ILCS 5/1-4-7).
- Trial proceeded on negligence only; the jury returned verdicts for defendants. Posttrial motions were denied, and insurers and the Estate appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether demolition of the Wirt Dexter building is common-law "abnormally dangerous/ultrahazardous" (strict liability) | Demolition of a multi‑story urban building is inherently ultrahazardous (relying on Clark) and thus strict liability should apply | Although some §520 factors favor plaintiffs, other §520 factors (appropriateness of place and community value) weigh against imposing strict liability; public‑policy reasons counsel against strict liability here | Court: Not ultrahazardous as a matter of law; summary judgment for Heneghan and Concord affirmed (5th and 6th §520 factors weighed heavily against strict liability) |
| Whether the municipal statute (65 ILCS 5/1-4-7) imposes strict liability on the City for demolition damage | The statute should impose strict liability because the City authorized the demolition and contractors acted as its agents | The statute requires an "actionable wrong," i.e., a breach of duty (negligence); its language and precedent mean negligence must be shown | Court: §1-4-7 is not a strict-liability statute; it requires negligence; trial court correctly barred the statutory strict-liability claim from the jury |
| Whether the City’s argument that the jury’s general negligence verdict forecloses review of strict-liability rulings (general‑verdict rule) | Plaintiffs: A negligence verdict does not preclude separate strict-liability review; jurors never considered strict-liability theory | City: Because proximate cause is required for both negligence and strict liability and the jury found no negligence, any error on strict liability was harmless under the general verdict rule | Court: Rejected City’s shortcut—because strict liability was not presented to the jury, the general negligence verdict does not automatically foreclose appellate review of the summary-judgment rulings on strict liability |
| Whether the Estate was entitled to JNOV or a new trial after jury found for Heneghan on negligence concerning 632 S. Wabash | Estate: Evidence did not support jury’s finding for Heneghan; no evidence that Phillips (Estate) was contributorily negligent | Heneghan: Conflicting evidence showed Estate hired an unqualified contractor who ignited the fire; jury could reasonably find Estate >50% negligent | Court: Evidence could support jury’s conclusion that Estate was more than 50% at fault; denial of JNOV and new trial was proper |
Key Cases Cited
- In re Chicago Flood Litigation, 176 Ill.2d 179 (supreme court) (adopts Restatement §520 factors and instructs courts to weigh all factors in ultrahazardous‑activity analysis)
- Clark v. City of Chicago, 88 Ill. App.3d 760 (app. ct.) (held demolition of a multistory building was inherently dangerous—relied on by plaintiffs)
- Moore v. Jewel Tea Co., 46 Ill.2d 288 (supreme court) (general‑verdict rule: a general verdict will be sustained if sufficient evidence supports any presented theory)
- Dillon v. Evanston Hospital, 199 Ill.2d 483 (supreme court) (general‑verdict rule and need for special interrogatories when multiple theories presented)
- Lazenby v. Mark’s Construction, Inc., 236 Ill.2d 83 (supreme court) (presumption that jury found for defendant on all defenses when a general verdict is returned)