Graybill v. Lampman, 332 P.3d 511

Prados purchased their 1966 lot and used a disputed eastern strip believing it was theirs.
A fence between parcels indicated, but later surveys showed the true boundary lay east of the Prados’ belief.
Lampmans bought the eastern lot in 1989 and fenced along the disputed area.
Prados continued to use and maintain the disputed parcel through 1989, treating it as their own.
Graybills entered into a 2011 contract for deed with the Prados, assuming the disputed parcel was included, sparking litigation.
District court found no adverse possession by Prados; appellate court reverses and remands for further factual development on adverse possession by Lampmans.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Did Prados establish a prima facie case of adverse possession from 1966 to 1989?	Prados possessed openly, exclusively, continuously, adversely; 1966–1989 enough.	Lampmans showed possession was permissive or not hostile.	Yes, prima facie established for 1966–1989.
Did Lampmans prove adverse possession after 1989 to repossess?	Lampmans did repossess after 1989 by fence and use.	Record insufficient; district court must evaluate after remand.	Remand to resolve whether adverse possession occurred post-1989.

Helm v. Clark, 244 P.3d 1052 (Wyo.2010) (standard for appellate review of factual findings; adverse possession framework)
Murdock v. Zier, 137 P.3d 147 (Wyo.2006) (ten-year period; elements of adverse possession; burden shifting in mistaken boundary cases)
Davis v. Chadwick, 55 P.3d 1267 (Wyo.2002) (open and notorious and substantial enclosure concepts in adverse possession)
Sturm v. City, 273 P.908 (Wyo.1929) (early articulation of open/notorious and possession doctrine in boundary cases)
Mader v. Stephenson, 501 P.2d 1253 (Wyo.1972) (possession in adverse possession discussions; relevant authorities)