Gray v. Shook
329 S.W.3d 186
Tex. App.2011Background
- G.W. was born July 9, 2003 to David Gray and Lucy Wood; Gray filed for joint managing conservatorship with exclusive right to designate residence, later Shook, G.W.'s maternal grandmother, intervened requesting exclusive right to establish primary residence.
- A bench trial in June 2008 heard Shook, Gray, Lucy, and Green testify; Shook claimed G.W. lived with her in Victoria, raised by her and her husband for about a year-and-a-half, with Lucy contributing but primarily living elsewhere.
- Shook argued it would significantly impair G.W.'s physical health if Gray were appointed managing conservator due to removal from the only home she knew and her security system in Victoria.
- Gray contended he should have greater access and eventual custody; he described a strong bond with G.W. and asserted he could provide a stable home in Seattle, with visits burdened by distance and work.
- The trial court found Shook should be sole managing conservator, Gray a possessory conservator, and ordered no co-residence with G.W. or Shook; it issued findings of best interest favoring Shook.
- This appeal challenging the trial court’s decision as an abuse of discretion was sustained; the court remanded for custodial hearings between Gray and Lucy, noting changing circumstances could affect best interests.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Overcoming the parental presumption | Gray argues no specific act by Gray harmed G.W., so presumption not overcome. | Shook contends protective harm from uprooting and lack of bonding justify nonparent custody. | Abuse of discretion; no specific act or identifiable conduct by Gray to cause harm. |
| Speculative harm evidence | Gray asserts presented evidence of actual harm from uprooting is insufficiently speculative to overcome presumption. | Shook relies on bonding, separation anxiety, and potential long-term harms to argue detrimental effects. | Abuse of discretion; evidence of potential harms was speculative and not sufficient to rebut presumption. |
| Sufficiency of evidence of harm tied to Gray | Gray maintains there were no specific acts by Gray causing harm; the court erred by crediting non-actor harm. | Shook contends the combination of separation anxiety and lack of bonding supports significant impairment if uprooted. | Evidence failed to show specific, identifiable acts by Gray causing significant harm; overstepped presumption limits. |
| Remand vs. render decision | Judgment should be reversed and rendered in Gray's favor given improper weighting of non-specific harm. | Remand necessary to update record and assess best interests under current circumstances. | Remand appropriate; interest of justice requires custodial hearings between Gray and Lucy given time elapsed and possible changed circumstances. |
Key Cases Cited
- May v. May, 829 S.W.2d 373 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1992) (nonparent must prove specific actions or omissions to rebut presumption)
- Lewelling v. Lewelling, 796 S.W.2d 164 (Tex. 1990) (strong presumption in favor of parental custody; need specific harm evidence)
- In re G.R.W., 191 S.W.3d 896 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2006) (nonparent may rebut presumption with evidence of negative effect on child absent blameworthy act)
- In re Rodriguez, 940 S.W.2d 265 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1997) (environmental impact of removal can rebut presumption without blameworthy act)
- Chavez v. Chavez, 148 S.W.3d 449 (Tex.App.-El Paso 2004) (illustrates limits of nonparent proof; context of previous decisions cited)
- In the Interest of R.T.K., 324 S.W.3d 896 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2010) (record supported trial court finding on potential emotional development impact)
- De La Pena, 999 S.W.2d 521 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1999) (recognizes stability and safety are critical to child development in ultimate inquiry)
