Gray v. Commissioner of Correction, 306 Conn. 664

Gray pleaded nolo contendere to first-degree manslaughter with a firearm on September 10, 1998, and was sentenced to 20 years.
In his first habeas action, Gray alleged trial counsel pressured him to plead nolo contendere through improper tactics.
The habeas court denied relief, concluding trial counsel’s actions did not prove ineffective assistance given the end result.
On appeal, the appellate court agreed the habeas court applied the correct standard, requiring a reasonable probability of a different outcome but found no deficiency in trial counsel’s performance.
Gray then filed a second habeas petition alleging ineffective appellate assistance by his first habeas appellate counsel for not advocating Hill v. Lockhart as the applicable standard.
The habeas court held that appellate counsel properly invoked Hill and Copas standards and that there was no deficient performance or prejudice.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
What standard governs appellate counsel in habeas appeals?	Gray argues Hill should control.	O’Brien argued Copas governs in this context.	Appellate standard as applied is correct; no deficiency shown.
Did appellate counsel’s brief raise or properly advocate the correct standard for trial-counsel ineffectiveness in guilty-plea cases?	Gray contends Hill was not properly briefed or advocated.	O’Brien did raise Hill and distinguish Copas.	Appellate counsel’s argument was adequate; no deficient performance.
Was there prejudice showing under Strickland for appellate counsel’s performance?	Gray would have prevailed on direct appeal if Hill were properly applied.	The Hill standard, even if argued, would not have altered the outcome given the record.	No prejudice established; outcome would not have differed.
Does the 'different outcome' component of Hill/Copas affect this plea-based case?	Copas' 'different outcome' test is inapplicable to a guilty-plea scenario.	The applicable standard remains a Hill-based prejudice inquiry, consistent with prior authority.	The Copas framework was appropriately treated as part of the overall prejudice analysis.

Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985) (applies Strickland to guilty pleas; prejudice hinges on likely trial outcome)
Copas v. Commissioner of Correction, 234 Conn. 139 (1995) (articulates the 'different outcome' prejudice standard for guilty-plea cases)
Baillargeon v. Commissioner of Correction, 67 Conn. App. 716 (2002) (modified Hill standard; reasonable probability to reject guilty plea)
Ledbetter v. Commissioner of Correction, 275 Conn. 451 (2005) (counsel need not advance untested theories; within existing law)
Moore v. Commissioner of Correction, 119 Conn. App. 530 (2010) (distinguishes appellate vs. trial counsel prejudice standards)
Small v. Commissioner of Correction, 286 Conn. 707 (2008) (advocates focus on meritorious issues; not required to raise all)