Grassi v. People
2014 CO 12
| Colo. | 2014Background
- Early-morning single-vehicle crash: driver Ronald Grassi seriously injured, passenger killed; Grassi unconscious at hospital.
- Trooper Benavides and accident reconstructionist Trooper Waters investigated scene, found no skid/yaw marks or external cause, concluded vehicle ran off road consistent with intoxicated driving.
- Corporal Riley directed Trooper Duncan to go to the hospital to investigate and to obtain a blood draw if he determined alcohol was involved.
- At the hospital Duncan smelled a strong odor of alcohol from Grassi and ordered two blood draws; results showed BAC above the legal limit.
- Grassi moved to suppress BAC evidence arguing lack of probable cause for involuntary blood draw; trial court denied, court of appeals initially reversed and remanded, then on remand affirmed after applying the fellow officer rule.
- Colorado Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether the fellow officer rule can impute the reconstructionists’ scene findings to Duncan at the time he ordered the blood draw.
Issues
| Issue | Grassi's Argument | People/State's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the fellow officer rule can impute other officers’ information to the officer who ordered an involuntary blood draw when that officer lacked independent knowledge | Fellow officer rule should only impute information known at time of assignment; Duncan did not know Waters’/Benavides’ findings when he ordered the draw, so no probable cause | Fellow officer rule imputes collective knowledge held at time of the search if officer acted as part of a coordinated investigation; Duncan joined such an investigation and the police collectively had probable cause | The rule imputes information possessed by the police as a whole at the time of the search if (1) officer acted pursuant to a coordinated investigation and (2) police possessed the information then; applied here, probable cause existed and no Fourth Amendment violation occurred |
| Proper timing/scope of information imputed by fellow officer rule | Imputation limited to information known at initial assignment | Imputation includes information gathered between assignment and the officer’s action as long as investigation remains coordinated | Court adopts People’s view: imputes information possessed by police at time of search, including developments after assignment |
| Whether odor of alcohol alone (or accident + single indicium) can establish probable cause for blood draw | Prior cases (Roybal/Reynolds) show odor or accident plus isolated indicium insufficient | When odor is combined with scene reconstruction ruling out external causes and behaviors consistent with intoxication, collective facts can establish probable cause | Distinguished Roybal/Reynolds; here combined, corroborating facts met probable cause standard |
| Whether drawing blood from an unconscious driver without individual officer’s direct knowledge violates Fourth Amendment | Yes — requires officer ordering search to have independent probable cause | No — collective probable cause under fellow officer rule suffices if requirements met | Collective probable cause imputed to Duncan; blood draws lawful |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Arias, 159 P.3d 134 (Colo. 2007) (articulates Colorado’s fellow officer rule and its imputation of collective knowledge)
- People v. Hazelhurst, 662 P.2d 1081 (Colo. 1983) (explains fellow officer rationale and cautions against post hoc aggregation to manufacture probable cause)
- People v. Schall, 59 P.3d 848 (Colo. 2002) (internal blood draw from unconscious person is a Fourth Amendment search requiring probable cause)
- People v. Roybal, 655 P.2d 410 (Colo. 1982) (odor alone, absent other indicia, insufficient for probable cause to arrest or order blood)
- People v. Reynolds, 895 P.2d 1059 (Colo. 1995) (accident plus admission of drinking hours earlier insufficient for probable cause)
- United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102 (1965) (observations of fellow officers engaged in a common investigation provide reliable basis for warrants)
- Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765 (1983) (knowledge held by cooperating law enforcement authorities is presumed shared among them)