Grappo v. McMills
11 Cal. App. 5th 996
| Cal. Ct. App. | 2017Background
- Pro se plaintiff Donald T. Grappo sued multiple defendants (naming a trustee, Kenneth McKean, among others) alleging misappropriation of trust assets; complaint was poorly pleaded and identified limited specific damages (including a $60,000 claim for personal property).
- McKean was personally served in December 2013, default was requested and entered in June–July 2014; the court initially refused to enter default judgment citing multiple deficiencies.
- McKean died on November 23, 2014. Grappo filed a second request for default judgment in December 2014 stating McKean was deceased and seeking $60,000; the clerk entered judgment for $60,750 without a prove-up hearing or apparent service on the decedent’s estate or personal representative.
- Aubrey Cambra, trustee/personal representative of McKean’s trust, learned of the judgment when Grappo filed a creditors’ claim and moved to vacate the default judgment. The trustee invoked § 663 and later § 473 (in reply) arguing the judgment was void because McKean was dead and the trustee had no notice.
- After a contested hearing the trial court vacated the default judgment as to McKean under § 473(d) (finding lack of notice/prejudice). Grappo appealed. The Court of Appeal affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Grappo) | Defendant's Argument (Trustee/Cambra) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1) Timeliness / proper statutory vehicle to attack judgment | Challenge to vacatur as untimely; relied on trustee’s failure to comply with time limits | Trustee argued judgment void and therefore no time limit under § 473(d); also invoked § 663/§ 473.5 below | Court: affirmed vacatur on § 473(d) ground (no need to decide void vs. voidable more broadly); trustee’s late citation of § 473(d) in reply was permissible and § 663 inapplicable to default judgments |
| 2) Is a judgment entered after a party’s death void or voidable? | Judgment should stand; public policy favors finality; the trustee waited and relief under § 473(b) (six‑month) was not timely | Trustee: judgment void (entered for a deceased person) and vacatable at any time; lacked notice and opportunity to defend | Court: did not definitively adopt new rule that such judgments are per se void, but applied Sacks-style prejudice analysis and affirmed vacatur under § 473(d) because trustee showed prejudice (no notice) |
| 3) Adequacy of complaint / court gatekeeper role before entering default judgment | Implicit: default judgment should stand | Trustee: entry was defective because complaint poorly pleaded, plaintiff lacked standing as beneficiary, and damage amount/proof unsupported; court must ensure defaults are supported by the complaint | Court: agreed the complaint was deficient, default judgment should not have entered on that record; reinforced court’s gatekeeper duty when entering default judgments |
| 4) Prejudice requirement to set aside judgment against decedent | Grappo: no prejudice because once default entered nothing could be done and decedent had defaulted earlier | Trustee: lack of notice and inability to participate caused prejudice (estate harmed by enforcement) | Court: trustee established prejudice (no notice/opportunity to seek relief), so vacatur under § 473(d) was appropriate |
Key Cases Cited
- Elston v. City of Turlock, 38 Cal.3d 227 (Cal. 1985) (section 473 relief is discretionary but should be liberally applied; courts favor disposition on the merits)
- Sacks v. FSR Brokerage, Inc., 7 Cal.App.4th 950 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (judgment for or against a decedent generally cannot be rendered without substitution; relief depends on prejudice/lack of notice)
- Fasuyi v. Pennatex, Inc., 167 Cal.App.4th 681 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) (trial courts act as gatekeepers in default cases and must ensure claims/judgments are consistent with the complaint)
- Rappleyea v. Campbell, 8 Cal.4th 975 (Cal. 1994) (policy note: liberality for relief from defaults gives way to finality of judgments after statutory periods)
- Woolley v. Seijo, 224 Cal.App.2d 615 (Cal. Ct. App. 1964) (where court acquired personal jurisdiction over a party before death, judgment entered after death is generally voidable, not void)
- Blank v. Kirwan, 39 Cal.3d 311 (Cal. 1985) (standard of review: setting aside default/default judgment reviewed for abuse of discretion)