Grant v. Commissioner of Correction, 342 Conn. 771

Background

Petitioner Lenworth Charles Grant, a Jamaican national with a U.S. green card, was charged after a 2014 domestic violence incident (assault in presence of infant) with risk of injury to a child and third‑degree strangulation, among other counts.
The complainant initially gave a statement and was treated for injuries but later recanted; prosecutors nevertheless insisted any resolution include a jail term.
Attorney David Cosgrove negotiated multiple plea offers; ultimately Grant entered an Alford plea to risk of injury to a child and third‑degree strangulation for a three‑year sentence fully suspended and three years probation.
Grant later violated probation, was incarcerated, and removal proceedings followed; he was deported to Jamaica in 2019.
In a habeas petition, Grant alleged Cosgrove failed to inquire about his immigration status and failed to advise him of near‑certain deportation consequences; the habeas court found that, even assuming deficient performance, Grant failed to prove prejudice because he did not establish he would have rejected the plea or that a more favorable offer existed.
On appeal, the Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed, concluding Grant did not meet the Strickland/Hill prejudice standard and that prosecutors credibly testified no more favorable plea was available.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether trial counsel’s failure to inquire about immigration status and to advise on deportation rendered assistance ineffective (prejudice prong)	Grant: had counsel warned him he would almost certainly be deported, there is a reasonable probability he would have rejected the plea and gone to trial	Respondent: Grant testified he was unsure he would have gone to trial; no contemporaneous evidence supports that he would have rejected the plea	Court: Denied—Grant failed to prove reasonable probability he would have rejected plea and insisted on trial (no prejudice)
Whether a more favorable plea offer was reasonably probable/available	Grant: counsel could have obtained or pursued a plea avoiding felony/deportation consequences	Respondent: Prosecutors credibly testified they would not drop the risk‑of‑injury count; no more favorable offer existed	Court: Denied—habeas court’s unchallenged finding that no better offer existed controls
Mootness due to deportation	Grant: appeal should not be moot because collateral consequences remain	Respondent: initially argued mootness but conceded after State v. Gomes	Court: Deportation did not render appeal moot; merits considered (Gomes governs)
Applicable standard for plea‑related ineffective assistance	Grant: must show reasonable probability he would have declined plea and gone to trial	Respondent: same standard applies; burden not met	Court: Applied Strickland/Hill standard; petitioner failed to show prejudice so performance prong need not be addressed

Key Cases Cited

North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970) (Supreme Court recognized pleas entered while maintaining innocence under certain circumstances)
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two‑pronged test for ineffective assistance of counsel)
Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985) (prejudice standard for plea‑related ineffective assistance requires reasonable probability defendant would have gone to trial)
Lee v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1958 (2017) (courts should look to contemporaneous evidence, not just post hoc assertions, to assess whether a defendant would have pleaded differently)
Small v. Commissioner of Correction, 286 Conn. 707 (2008) (standard of review for habeas judge’s factual findings and mixed questions)
State v. Gomes, 337 Conn. 826 (2021) (deportation does not render appeal moot; courts may address collateral consequences)
State v. Simpson, 329 Conn. 820 (2018) (explaining Alford plea consequences)
Nardini v. Manson, 207 Conn. 118 (1988) (courts may dispose of ineffective‑assistance claims on prejudice ground without resolving performance)