Grant County Unified Community Resource Council, Inc. v. Pennington
2017 Ark. App. 116
| Ark. Ct. App. | 2017Background
- Mary Pennington worked as an overnight advocate at Grant County Unified Community Resource Council (the shelter) from Feb 2010; her duties included answering a 24/7 crisis hotline, intake, light cleaning, and resident assistance.
- Pennington was scheduled for alternating multi-day shifts (including 24-hour shifts) but paid on a 40-hour-per-week basis; she claims she actually worked up to 96–128 hours in alternating 2-week periods.
- The shelter had a verbal policy (per supervisor Diana Riley) deducting eight hours per overnight shift as unpaid "sleep time" and excluding bona fide meal periods; no written agreement existed.
- Pennington testified she was expected to answer calls at any time during overnight shifts, could not freely leave the premises, and denied agreeing to an eight-hour unpaid sleep deduction.
- Pennington sued under the Arkansas Minimum Wage Act for unpaid overtime; the circuit court granted summary judgment to Pennington, finding no express or implied agreement to exclude sleep or meal time and that her sleep periods were compensable.
- The shelter appealed; the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, holding material facts about whether an agreement existed were disputed and summary judgment was inappropriate.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether sleep and meal periods during 24‑hour shifts are compensable | Pennington: no agreement to exclude sleep/meal time; she was "engaged to wait" and could not use time freely, so time is compensable | Shelter: there was an express or implied agreement to exclude bona fide sleep (8 hrs/night) and meal periods; paychecks reflecting 40 hrs imply acceptance | Material dispute exists about an agreement; summary judgment improper; facts for trial |
| Whether an implied agreement bars recovery based on acceptance of paychecks | Pennington: acceptance of pay does not prove meeting‑of‑minds or waiver | Shelter: long acceptance of 40‑hour pay shows implied consent to exclusion | Court held factual dispute on whether acceptance constituted an implied agreement; trial required |
| Applicability of "companionship/homeworker" or other AMWA exceptions | Pennington: exceptions do not apply; she performed compensable duties | Shelter: claimed companionship/homeworker exception and bona fide sleep/meal period exception | Circuit court found no proof of companionship exception; appellate court did not resolve exception—remanded for trial due to factual disputes |
| Appropriateness of summary judgment where parties' depositions conflict | Pennington: evidence supports judgment as a matter of law | Shelter: conflicting testimony creates factual issue | Court of Appeals: trial court improperly weighed conflicting testimony; summary judgment reversed and remanded |
Key Cases Cited
- Killian v. Gibson, 423 S.W.3d 98 (discussion of summary-judgment standard)
- Po- Boy Land Co. v. Mullins, 384 S.W.3d 555 (cross-motions for summary judgment still require resolving material factual disputes)
- Acuff v. Bumgarner, 371 S.W.3d 709 (denial of cross-motions appropriate when material facts remain)
- Deltic Timber Corp. v. Newland, 374 S.W.3d 261 (summary judgment improper where neither party is entitled as a matter of law)
- Vang Lee v. Mansour, 289 S.W.3d 170 (trial court erred by weighing conflicting facts and making findings on summary judgment)
- K. C. Props. v. Lowell Inv. Partners, 373 Ark. 14 (meeting‑of‑minds required for an implied agreement to exclude time)