Granicz v. Chirillo
147 So. 3d 544
| Fla. Dist. Ct. App. | 2014Background
- Granicz, as personal representative of Jacqueline Granicz’s estate, sued Dr. Chirillo and related entities for medical malpractice alleging breach of duty caused Jacqueline’s suicide.
- Trial court granted summary judgment concluding Dr. Chirillo had no legal duty to prevent the suicide.
- Jacqueline had a history of depression; she stopped Effexor due to side effects, later started Lexapro as a new antidepressant.
- On Oct. 8, 2008 Jacqueline reported worsening symptoms during an office call; the assistant documented concerns and the doctor changed treatment to Lexapro with a GI referral, but no office visit was scheduled.
- Jacqueline committed suicide the following day; expert testimony indicated the standard of care required assessing suicide risk during such a call and intervening if necessary.
- The appellate court held that Granicz’s experts raised a genuine issue of duty, reversed the summary judgment, and remanded for proceedings; the decision acknowledged conflict with Lawlor and certified conflict.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Duty to prevent suicide or to provide reasonable care | Granicz argues Chirillo owed a duty to exercise reasonable care in treating depression. | Chirillo had no duty to prevent an unforeseeable suicide; expert stacking objections apply. | Duty exists; expert evidence precludes summary judgment; remand. |
| Conflict with Lawlor and admissibility of expert affidavits | Plaintiffs’ experts support standard of care; Lawlor conflicts should be resolved by not upholding a no-duty ruling. | Lawlor governs; expert affidavits should not create duty; potential conflict. | Court rejects Lawlor’s approach; adopts duty finding and remands; conflict certified. |
| Proximate cause terminology and jury question | Breach of duty by Chirillo proximately caused Jacqueline’s suicide; experts support causation. | Even with duty, causation is a jury issue; summary judgment appropriate if no duty. | Proximate cause remains a jury question on remand. |
Key Cases Cited
- McCain v. Fla. Power Corp., 593 So.2d 500 (Fla. 1992) (duty focuses on foreseeability and zone of risk; not proximate cause)
- Sweet v. Sheehan, 932 So.2d 365 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006) (standard of care for physicians; expert testimony generally governs)
- Perez v. United States, 883 F.Supp.2d 1257 (S.D. Fla. 2012) (standard of care for depression treatment; expert testimony as to duty)
- Estate of Rotell ex rel. Rotell v. Kuehnle, 38 So.3d 783 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010) (medical malpractice duty; expert testimony on standard of care)
- Lawlor v. Orlando, 795 So.2d 147 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001) (dissent’s view on psychotherapist duty; conflict with Lawlor noted)
- Volusia County v. Aberdeen at Ormond Beach, L.P., 760 So.2d 126 (Fla. 2000) (foreseeability and duty; duty as legal question, not proximate cause)
- Zack v. Centro Español Hosp., Inc., 319 So.2d 34 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975) (stacking inferences rule not applicable to reasonable-inference expert testimony)
- Brooks v. Serrano, 209 So.2d 279 (Fla. 4th DCA 1968) (early formulation of standard-of-care duties)