Grange Mutual Insurance Company and Fieldstar, Inc. v. Faye L. Kessler and William J. Kessler (mem. dec.)
22A01-1702-CT-376
| Ind. Ct. App. | Sep 6, 2017Background
- Fieldstar, an Indiana company, contracted informally with Rick Day to perform three roles: repair Fieldstar vehicles through his auto shop, transport vehicles between Fieldstar locations, and sell Fieldstar vehicles (receiving commissions).
- On Jan. 12, 2013, Fieldstar paid Day $775 to move trucks and cars; Day engaged Aaron Weddle to drive a Chevrolet Aveo from Bloomington to Day’s New Albany shop.
- While en route, Weddle crossed the center line and collided head-on with a vehicle driven by Faye Kessler (with passenger William Charles), causing suit against Fieldstar, its insurer Grange, Day, Weddle, and others.
- Fieldstar’s Grange auto policy covered permissive users but excluded persons using a covered auto while working in a business of selling, servicing, repairing, parking, or storing autos unless that business was the insured’s.
- Fieldstar (with Grange) moved for summary judgment arguing Weddle was excluded as acting to further Day’s independent auto-repair/sale business; the trial court denied summary judgment, finding coverage for Weddle was not foreclosed as a matter of law.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Weddle was an “insured” under Fieldstar’s policy or excluded because he was working in a business of selling/repairing autos | Kessler: Weddle was merely transporting Fieldstar’s vehicle and not engaged in an independent repair/sales business; thus covered | Fieldstar/Grange: Weddle acted for Day’s independent auto repair/sales business (Day hired Weddle), so exclusion applies | Denied summary judgment for Fieldstar — genuine factual disputes exist whether Weddle acted to further Day’s independent business or Fieldstar’s vehicle-selling operations; coverage question unsuitable for resolution as a matter of law |
Key Cases Cited
- Hughley v. State, 15 N.E.3d 1000 (Ind. 2014) (summary judgment standard errs on allowing marginal cases to proceed)
- Holiday Hospitality Franchising, Inc. v. AMCO Ins. Co., 983 N.E.2d 574 (Ind. 2013) (contract interpretation is a question of law suited for de novo review)
- Warrick County ex rel. Conner v. Hill, 973 N.E.2d 1138 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (contract may be construed on summary judgment absent ambiguity requiring extrinsic evidence)
- Tate v. Secura Ins., 587 N.E.2d 665 (Ind. 1992) (ambiguity requiring extrinsic evidence makes meaning for factfinder)
- SCI Propane, LLC v. Frederick, 39 N.E.3d 675 (Ind. 2015) (cross-motions for summary judgment evaluated separately)
- Mid-America Sound Corp. v. Ind. State Fair Comm’n (In re Ind. State Fair Litigation), 49 N.E.3d 545 (Ind. 2016) (summary judgment principles reiterated)
- Am. Fam. Ins. Co. v. Nat’l Ins. Ass’n, 577 N.E.2d 969 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991) (exclusions apply when use is to effectuate a third party’s independent auto business)
- Truck Ins. Exch. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 538 P.2d 529 (Wash. Ct. App. 1975) (same principle on exclusions for independent auto businesses)
