958 F.3d 1050
11th Cir.2020Background
- On Oct. 15, 2015, Mark Lucas (an FST employee) drove a dump truck owned by Four Seasons Trucking (FST) and sequentially collided with two vehicles. The truck, however, was listed on insurance issued to Four Seasons Trucking & Grading (T&G), a sister company, not on FST’s declarations.
- Grange Mutual issued three relevant policies: two to FST (including an umbrella) and one to T&G. Grange sued for a declaratory judgment about its coverage obligations; parallel state tort suits against FST and Grange were pending.
- The district court held Grange liable under the T&G policy (the truck qualified as “Any ‘Auto’”) but not liable under the FST policies, concluding FST had not shown a lease granting T&G exclusive use (required for a "borrowed"/"hired" auto). The court also found the sequence of collisions constituted a single accident.
- Key evidentiary facts: Natalie Atkinson (president) testified that trucks were leased from FST to T&G and that a written lease existed but she could not locate it; no written lease or evidence of lease terms/payments was produced during discovery.
- Defendants later submitted a new Atkinson affidavit with specific lease-terms assertions and statements that originals were lost/destroyed; the district court denied reconsideration as the affidavit raised evidence that could and should have been presented at summary judgment.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Coverage under FST policy (was truck a "Hired/Borrowed Auto") | Grange: no coverage because FST owned the truck and did not show it had been restricted from use such that FST "borrowed" it back | Defendants: FST had leased the truck to T&G (written lease) giving T&G exclusive use, so FST borrowed it back when Lucas drove it | Affirmed: No genuine issue on lease element—Defendants failed to show an enforceable lease granting exclusive use, so no coverage under FST policy |
| Sufficiency of evidence re: written lease / best-evidence rule | Grange: proponent must produce the writing or establish an admissible exception; Defendants produced no originals or proof of exception at summary judgment | Defendants: Atkinson’s testimony and the truck being listed on T&G policy (and premium payments) support existence and terms of lease; later affidavit said originals were lost | Affirmed: At summary judgment Defendants failed to invoke a Rule 1004 exception or present facts proving contents (consideration, exclusive-use terms); speculation and insurer-premium payments insufficient |
| Motion for reconsideration (new affidavit asserting lost originals and lease terms) | Defendants: new affidavit shows originals lost/destroyed so secondary evidence admissible; supplies specific lease terms | Grange: affidavit is belated; evidence was available earlier and cannot be introduced via Rule 59(e) | Affirmed: District court did not abuse discretion—new evidence could and should have been presented before judgment, so reconsideration denied |
| Number of accidents (single vs. multiple collisions) | Grange: Georgia’s cause theory (State Auto) controls and the collisions were a single continuous cause; policy language also contemplates continuous exposure to same conditions | Defendants: Policy’s phrasing could allow multiple accidents when collisions are separate; argue multiple collisions mean multiple accidents | Affirmed: Under Georgia law (cause theory) and the policy read as a whole, the sequential collisions arose from one proximate, uninterrupted cause and are a single accident |
Key Cases Cited
- State Auto Property & Casualty Co. v. Matty, 690 S.E.2d 614 (Ga. 2010) (adopted the "cause" theory: number of accidents determined by proximate, uninterrupted cause)
- Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986) (summary-judgment standard when nonmoving party lacks evidence on an essential element)
- Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986) (nonmovant must do more than raise metaphysical doubt to survive summary judgment)
- Michael Linet, Inc. v. Village of Wellington, 408 F.3d 757 (11th Cir. 2005) (motion for reconsideration is not a vehicle to present evidence available before judgment)
- James River Ins. Co. v. Ground Down Eng’g, Inc., 540 F.3d 1270 (11th Cir. 2008) (de novo review of insurance contract interpretation)
- Essex Ins. Co. v. Barrett Moving & Storage, Inc., 885 F.3d 1292 (11th Cir. 2018) (summary judgment review standard and related precedent)