Graham v. Spireon, Inc.
1:14-cv-00131
N.D. Ill.Jul 25, 2014Background
- Plaintiff Sean Graham was employed (originally by EnfotraceGPS, later by Spireon) as a sales manager and worked remotely; he alleges he lived and worked in Plainfield, Illinois while employed.
- Graham’s main account was J.D. Byrider (corporate office in Indiana; franchise locations in Illinois); parties dispute whether Graham visited Illinois locations.
- Graham reported incidents of sexual harassment and was terminated on or about June 30, 2012; he received a Chicago EEOC right-to-sue letter.
- Spireon is headquartered outside Illinois (California and Tennessee); its HR records list Graham’s residence as California then Florida.
- Spireon moved to dismiss or transfer for improper venue under Rule 12(b)(3), arguing Title VII venue does not lie in the Northern District of Illinois.
- The court considered evidentiary submissions and resolved factual disputes in Graham’s favor for venue purposes.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether venue is proper under Title VII’s exclusive provisions | Graham - venue proper because he worked in Illinois and would have continued to work there but for termination | Spireon - termination decision did not occur in Illinois; employment records and offices are not in Illinois; Graham would not have continued working in Illinois | Venue is proper: Graham satisfied the Title VII provision that he would have worked in the district but for the unlawful practice |
| Whether plaintiff’s residence (records showing CA/FL) defeats venue | Graham - residence records do not negate evidence he worked in Illinois | Spireon - corporate records showing CA/FL undercut contact with Illinois | Court: residence alone is not dispositive; other evidence of working in Illinois suffices |
| Standard for resolving factual disputes on a venue motion | Graham - court should credit plaintiff’s factual submissions and reasonable inferences | Spireon - corporate records should control | Court applies precedent: resolve factual conflicts in plaintiff’s favor for venue disputes |
| Whether court should transfer under 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) | Graham - opposes transfer; venue proper here | Spireon - seeks transfer to Eastern District of Tennessee | Denied: because venue proper in Northern District of Illinois, transfer not warranted |
Key Cases Cited
- J. Walker & Sons, Ltd. v. DeMert & Dougherty, Inc., 821 F.2d 399 (7th Cir. 1987) (resolve factual conflicts in plaintiff’s favor on venue dispute)
- Deluxe Ice Cream Co. v. R.C.H. Tool Corp., 726 F.2d 1209 (7th Cir. 1984) (same principle on resolving venue-related factual disputes)
- Interlease Aviation Investors II (Aloha) LLC v. Vanguard Airlines, Inc., 262 F. Supp. 2d 898 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (courts may look beyond complaint when deciding venue)
- McDonald v. American Fed’n of Musicians, 308 F. Supp. 664 (N.D. Ill. 1970) (only one Title VII venue provision must be satisfied)
- Karlberg Europ. Transpa, Inc. v. JK–Josef Kratz Vertriebsgeselischaft MbH, 699 F. Supp. 669 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (courts may examine facts beyond the complaint on venue motions)
- Benton v. England, 222 F. Supp. 2d 728 (D. Md. 2002) (plaintiff’s residence alone does not establish Title VII venue)