Graham v. Prochaska, 429 S.W.3d 650

In 1950, George Prochaska and Elsie Prochaska conveyed land in Karnes County, Texas to John and Frances Regmund, reserving a royalty interest described in the deed.
The deed’s save-and-except clause reserved one-half of the one-eighth royalty to Prochaska, stated as one-sixteenth of all minerals, with taxes excluded.
The agreement also included an and-provided clause burdening Prochaska’s reservation to pay two preexisting outstanding mineral royalty reservations until terminated.
The Regmunds later executed new leases providing a one-fifth landowner’s royalty and filed suit for a declaratory judgment that Prochaska had a fixed one-sixteenth royalty.
The Prochaskas counterclaimed for a floating one-half royalty, arguing they would receive half of whatever the Regmunds’ landowner’s royalty produced, current and future.
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Prochaskas, holding a floating one-half royalty was reserved.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the deed reserves a floating or fixed royalty.	Prochaskas: language describes floating royalty (one-half of the one-eighth)	Regmunds: language describes fixed one-sixteenth royalty	Floating royalty consistent with surrounding language and context
How the ‘provided’ and ‘intent’ clauses affect the Prochaskas’ interest.	Prochaskas: burdened to pay existing reservations; future effect as floating interest	Regmunds: intent clauses limit to fixed interest when viewed with others	Clauses harmonize to confirm floating interest for Prochaskas and present Regmunds’ share to be the other half of landowner’s royalty
Whether extrinsic deeds referenced in the deed can be considered to interpret the reservation.	Prochaskas: incorporated prior deeds to define burdened reservations	Regmunds: should not rely on extrinsic documents absent ‘subject to’ language	Extrinsic references rejected; four-corners harmonization controls; no reliance on outside documents

Luckel v. White, 819 S.W.2d 459 (Tex. 1991) (four-corners rule; harmonization required; ambiguity governs extrinsic reference)
Cockrell v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 299 S.W.2d 672 (Tex. 1956) (incorporation of leases under ‘subject to’ language; extrinsic documents when language is ambiguous)
Petty v. Winn Exploration Co., Inc., 816 S.W.2d 432 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1991) (context of reservation and reservation interplay within easement/interest instruments)
Concord Oil Co. v. Pennzoil Exploration & Prod. Co., 966 S.W.2d 451 (Tex. 1998) (harmonization and overall intent when construing deed language)
Sundance Minerals, L.P. v. Moore, 354 S.W.3d 507 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2011) (fixed vs floating royalty; contextual language governs interpretation)
Hausser v. Cuellar, 345 S.W.3d 462 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2011) (four-corners rule; admonition against overreliance on extrinsic sources; en banc opinion cited)
Garrett v. Dils Co., 299 S.W.2d 904 (Tex. 1957) (recognizes usual lease royalty as one-eighth; informs estate-misconception context)