Graham v. Albertsons
462 P.3d 367
Utah2020Background
- Steven Graham, an at-will employee at Albertson’s distribution center, reported a workplace back injury and was later terminated.
- Graham filed an administrative retaliation complaint under Utah Occupational Safety and Health Act (UOSHA) § 34A-6-203; the Division found no wrongful termination.
- Graham sought review with the Labor Commission ALJ; the ALJ denied summary relief and dismissed claims for certain damages as beyond the Division’s jurisdiction.
- Graham then sued in district court for wrongful termination in violation of public policy (plus contract claims). Albertson’s moved for partial summary judgment arguing UOSHA preempted Graham’s common-law claim.
- The district court granted Albertson’s motion, inferring implied preemption from UOSHA’s comprehensive scheme; Graham appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether UOSHA preempts common-law wrongful termination (public-policy) claims | Graham: UOSHA contains no exclusive-remedy clause and § 34A-6-110(1) preserves other statutory and common-law requirements, so no preemption | Albertson’s: UOSHA’s comprehensive regulatory scheme implies legislative intent to occupy the field and preempt common-law remedies | Reversed: UOSHA does not evince clear intent to preempt; § 34A-6-110(1) prevents inferring preemption from structure and purpose |
| Whether a plaintiff must first establish a valid common-law claim before preemption analysis | Graham relied on district court’s assumption that a common-law claim existed (Albertson’s did not contest it on summary judgment) | Albertson’s did not press lack-of-common-law-claim here | Court: common-law cause must exist before preemption analysis, but the issue was not presented and the Court declined to decide it |
| Proper scope of § 34A-6-110(1) (savings clause) and use of statutory headings | Graham: §110(1) broadly preserves “requirements … otherwise recognized by law,” including common-law wrongful termination claims | Albertson’s: §110 should be read narrowly (limited to worker-injury statutes), relying on the section heading | Court: §110(1) is broad; narrow reading would render subsection (1) superfluous in light of (2); headings don’t control—§110(1) undercuts any inference of preemption |
Key Cases Cited
- Retherford v. AT&T Commc’ns of Mountain States, Inc., 844 P.2d 949 (Utah 1992) (articulates two-step test for statutory preemption of common law causes of action)
- Jedrziewski v. Smith, 128 P.3d 1146 (Utah 2005) (preemption analysis presupposes an existing valid common-law claim)
- Gottling v. P.R. Inc., 61 P.3d 989 (Utah 2002) (analyzing statutory structure and administrative scheme to infer preemptive intent)
- Ray v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 359 P.3d 614 (Utah 2015) (defines contours of wrongful termination in violation of public policy)
- United States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation, 564 U.S. 162 (2011) (canon against reading statutes to render provisions superfluous)
- Turner v. Staker & Parson Cos., 284 P.3d 600 (Utah 2012) (statutory interpretation principle to give effect to every word)