Graham S Henry v. Charles Ryan
720 F.3d 1073
9th Cir.2013Background
- Graham Saunders Henry was convicted of first-degree murder, kidnapping, robbery, and theft; sentenced to death (originally 1988, resentenced 1995). After state direct appeal and multiple PCR petitions, he filed a federal habeas petition which the district court denied.
- The facts at trial were contested: Henry claimed he was asleep in the camper and Foote acted alone; the state presented evidence (photographs, footprint analysis, blood on Henry’s clothes, flight and false ID) that Henry actively participated in the killing or was an accomplice.
- Henry raised federal habeas claims including: Brady/Napue (suppression/alteration of photos, withheld codefendant notes, and false testimony), juror misconduct (two jurors conducted an out-of-court experiment), unconstitutional causal-nexus requirement for mitigation at sentencing, and ineffective assistance of resentencing counsel for failing to investigate/present childhood sexual abuse and mental-health mitigation.
- The district court denied relief (and denied evidentiary development); the Ninth Circuit reviewed de novo where appropriate and applied AEDPA deference to state-court merits rulings adjudicated on the merits.
- The Ninth Circuit affirmed: (1) withheld codefendant notes were not materially exculpatory under Brady; (2) claims about altered/omitted photos and allegedly false patrolman testimony were procedurally defaulted or meritless; (3) juror-experiment evidence did not produce a substantial and injurious effect on the verdict; (4) any causal-nexus error in mitigation was harmless; and (5) resentencing counsel’s performance did not establish Strickland prejudice.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Brady: suppression of codefendant Foote’s notes/drawing | Notes corroborate Henry’s account (footprints/positions); suppression violated Brady and was material | Notes were hearsay or inculpatory, minimally exculpatory, and would not produce reasonable probability of different verdict | Denied — not material under Brady; evidentiary hearing denied |
| Brady: alteration/omission of crime-scene photographs | State altered/omitted photos; that suppression violated due process and was material | Claim is procedurally defaulted; Henry was aware earlier and not diligent; even on merits, evidence not sufficient | Denied — procedurally defaulted; no cause and prejudice; no evidentiary hearing |
| Napue: knowingly false testimony by Detective Patterson about footprints | Enhanced-photo analysis shows Henry, not Patterson, made berm footprints; Patterson therefore knowingly testified falsely | No evidence Patterson knew testimony was false rather than mistaken; prosecution didn’t know of perjury | Denied on merits — Henry failed to show knowing false testimony or that prosecution knew it; no hearing |
| Juror misconduct: two jurors performed an experiment about audibility from camper | Experiment produced extrinsic evidence that undermines Henry’s testimony, violating Sixth Amendment impartial jury right | Extrinsic info was noninflammatory, cumulative, within common knowledge, and case had substantial other evidence; no substantial and injurious effect on verdict | Certificate of appealability denied; claim rejected as non-prejudicial |
| Causal-nexus mitigation rule (Eighth Amendment) | Arizona courts required nexus between historical alcoholism and crime, violating Lockett/Eddings/Tennard | State courts independently reviewed mitigation; intoxication at crime was considered; historical alcoholism was weak/unproven so any error harmless | Denied — even assuming error, no substantial and injurious effect on sentencing under Brecht |
| Ineffective assistance at resentencing (penalty phase) | Counsel failed to investigate/present childhood sexual abuse and mental-health mitigation (Dr. Levitt) | Record already contained scant sexual-abuse/mental-health evidence; new material limited and Dr. Levitt’s report was cautious and based on no interview; no reasonable probability of different sentence | Denied — no Strickland prejudice shown; AEDPA standards not met |
Key Cases Cited
- Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (constitutional duty to disclose materially exculpatory evidence)
- Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (due process violated by prosecution’s knowing use of false testimony)
- Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263 (Brady materiality standard; reasonable probability test)
- Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668 (when suppression may establish cause for procedural default)
- Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478 (cause standard for procedural default requires objective external impediment)
- Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (habeas harmless-error standard — substantial and injurious effect)
- Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (sentencing must allow consideration of relevant mitigating evidence)
- Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (sentencing courts must consider mitigating evidence even if it lacks causal nexus)
- Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274 (nexus requirement invalid where it prevents consideration of relevant mitigation)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (two-part ineffective-assistance standard)
- Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393 (harmless-error review of exclusion of mitigating evidence)
- Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170 (limits on federal evidentiary development under AEDPA)