Grafton County Attorney's Office v. Elizabeth Canner & a.
147 A.3d 410
| N.H. | 2016Background
- John Doe was indicted and tried on felony charges; he was acquitted and then filed a petition under RSA 651:5 to annul his arrest/prosecution records; the Superior Court granted annulment.
- While the annulment petition was pending, Elizabeth Canner submitted Right-to-Know requests to the Grafton County Attorney’s Office and the Hanover Police Department seeking records of Doe’s arrest, investigation, and trial.
- The county attorney sought a declaratory judgment asking whether records held by arresting and prosecuting agencies would be exempt from disclosure under RSA 91-A:4, I if the annulment were granted.
- The trial court held that RSA 651:5 does not clearly and entirely exempt arresting/prosecuting agency records from public inspection under the Right-to-Know Law and denied a categorical exemption; it left open other possible exemptions (e.g., privacy, work product).
- Doe appealed; the Supreme Court reviewed de novo whether records of arresting and prosecuting agencies pertaining to an annulled arrest/prosecution are categorically exempt from disclosure.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Doe) | Defendant's Argument (Canner/County) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether RSA 651:5 X(a) creates an express statutory bar exempting arrest/prosecution records from public inspection under RSA 91-A:4, I | Annulment treats the record as if it never occurred, so records must be exempt from public disclosure to achieve annulment’s purpose of removing stigma | RSA 651:5 explicitly treats different record-keepers differently and does not direct police/prosecutors to seal or remove records; arrest/prosecutor files remain subject to Right-to-Know requests | Court held no categorical exemption: RSA 651:5 does not render arresting/prosecuting agency records categorically exempt from public inspection under RSA 91-A:4, I |
| Whether acquittal changes the analysis so that records must be removed from public access after annulment | Because Doe was acquitted, annulment’s purpose (eliminate stigma) requires removal of police/prosecutor files from public access | Statute treats acquitted and convicted persons the same regarding use/disclosure of annulled records; public interest in scrutiny of law enforcement/prosecution decisions remains strong | Court rejected special treatment for acquittal; acquittal does not mandate removal of arrest/prosecutor records from public inspection |
Key Cases Cited
- Lovejoy v. Linehan, 161 N.H. 483 (N.H. 2011) (annulment treats person as if never arrested but does not cloak the record itself in secrecy)
- Prof'l Firefighters of N.H. v. Local Gov't Ctr., 159 N.H. 699 (N.H. 2010) (Right-to-Know Law construed to increase public access; disclosure-favoring construction)
- CaremarkPCS Health v. N.H. Dep't of Admin. Servs., 167 N.H. 583 (N.H. 2015) (statutory construction rules for RSA chapter 91-A)
- G.D. v. Kenny, 15 A.3d 300 (N.J. 2011) (expungement does not erase historical facts or bar public discourse about past convictions)
- Panas v. Harakis & K-Mart Corp., 129 N.H. 591 (N.H. 1987) (scope of annulment statute limited to the conviction itself)
- Williams v. Pennsylvania, 136 S. Ct. 1899 (U.S. 2016) (public accountability for prosecutorial decisions)
- Cheney v. United States Dist. Court for D.C., 542 U.S. 367 (U.S. 2004) (prosecutorial accountability and public access considerations)