Grady v. North Carolina
135 S. Ct. 1368
| SCOTUS | 2015Background
- Torrey Dale Grady had prior sex-related convictions (1997, 2006) and, after serving his sentence, was ordered under North Carolina law to enroll in a satellite-based monitoring (SBM) program that would require lifelong ankle tracking.
- Grady conceded his recidivist status but challenged SBM as an unreasonable Fourth Amendment search and seizure.
- North Carolina trial court ordered SBM; the Court of Appeals rejected Grady’s Fourth Amendment challenge, relying on a prior state decision distinguishing GPS-on-vehicle cases and civil monitoring.
- The North Carolina Supreme Court summarily dismissed discretionary review; Grady petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for certiorari.
- The State argued the SBM program might not be intended to "obtain information," and faulted Grady for not submitting evidence of what data the program collects; the statute, however, mandates continuous, time-correlated geographic tracking and reporting of violations.
- The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari, held that attaching a tracking device to a person is a physical intrusion constituting a Fourth Amendment search under Jones and Jardines, vacated the state-court judgment, and remanded for consideration of reasonableness.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does nonconsensual SBM that attaches a tracking device to a person constitute a Fourth Amendment search? | Grady: Attaching an ankle GPS is a physical intrusion to obtain location information and thus a search under Jones. | State: SBM is civil; prior state precedent distinguishes it from Jones and contends Grady offered no evidence the program obtains information. | Held: Yes — physical intrusion by attaching a device to a person to obtain information is a search under Jones and Jardines. |
| Does the governmental purpose (civil vs. criminal) determine whether SBM is a search? | Grady: Purpose does not negate Fourth Amendment protection; civil programs can be searches. | State: Civil nature distinguishes SBM from criminal investigative searches in Jones. | Held: Rejected — Fourth Amendment protection extends beyond criminal investigations; purpose does not avoid search analysis. |
| Must the court evaluate whether SBM actually obtains information before finding a search? | Grady: Statute and program plainly obtain continuous location data; no further proof needed. | State: Grady failed to introduce implementation evidence showing information collection. | Held: Statute’s requirements (continuous, time-correlated tracking, reporting) establish that SBM is designed to obtain information; physical intrusion plus information collection equals a search. |
| Is SBM per se unconstitutional? | Grady: SBM is an unreasonable search as applied. | State: Program is permissible under state interests. | Held: Not decided — Court remanded. The Court found SBM to be a search but left the reasonableness inquiry (totality of circumstances) to the state courts to evaluate in the first instance. |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012) (installation and use of GPS on vehicle constitutes a Fourth Amendment search due to physical trespass)
- Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1 (2013) (police use of a drug-sniffing dog on a home’s curtilage is a Fourth Amendment search because of physical intrusion into protected area)
- Camara v. Municipal Court of City and County of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523 (1967) (administrative housing inspections are searches under the Fourth Amendment)
- Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746 (2010) (Fourth Amendment protections extend beyond criminal investigation contexts)
- Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843 (2006) (reasonableness analysis can permit suspicionless searches of certain supervised persons)
- Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995) (suspension of privacy interests can be reasonable under special-needs and context-specific Fourth Amendment analysis)
- R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Durham County, 479 U.S. 130 (1986) (treats a state high-court dismissal for lack of a substantial federal question as a decision on the merits for certiorari-review purposes)