Grace v. District of Columbia, 187 F. Supp. 3d 124

Background

Plaintiffs (Grace and the Pink Pistols) challenged the District of Columbia’s concealed‑carry licensing requirement that applicants show a “good reason to fear injury to his or her person or property” (the “good reason” requirement). Grace applied, cited the Second Amendment, and was denied solely for failing to show a district‑defined special need.
D.C.’s licensing scheme requires registration, eligibility screening (age, criminal/mental‑health bars), training, and an MPD interview; open carry remains prohibited. The “good reason” criterion was implemented by statute and MPD regulations, requiring specific threats or prior attacks and excluding mere residence in a high‑crime area.
Plaintiffs moved for a preliminary (and permanent) injunction to enjoin enforcement of the “good reason” requirement and to compel issuance of licenses to qualified applicants who otherwise meet all requirements.
The court applied the D.C. Circuit two‑step Second Amendment framework (Heller II): (1) whether the law burdens conduct within the Second Amendment’s scope; (2) if so, whether it survives means‑end scrutiny.
The court found plaintiffs substantially likely to succeed on the merits, that the plaintiffs would suffer irreparable harm, and that the public interest and equities favor injunctive relief; it granted a preliminary injunction but denied a permanent injunction to allow fuller factual development.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Does the Second Amendment protect carrying arms for self‑defense outside the home?	Second Amendment text & history protect bearing (carrying) for confrontation; historical practice shows public carry was common.	The right is primarily domiciliary or can be limited in dense/unique urban jurisdictions like D.C.	The right to bear arms encompasses public carry for self‑defense; not limited to the home.
Does the D.C. “good reason” requirement fall outside the Second Amendment as a longstanding, presumptively lawful regulation?	Even if some historic regulatory analogues exist, the requirement burdens protected conduct (public carry for self‑defense) and thus is rebuttably presumptive at best.	The requirement follows longstanding traditions (e.g., surety/recognizance laws and some jurisdictions’ permit schemes) so it lies outside Second Amendment protection.	Defendants are unlikely to show an unrebuttable longstanding tradition; the requirement burdens conduct squarely within the Amendment.
What level of scrutiny applies to the “good reason” requirement?	The requirement targets core self‑defense conduct and substantially burdens the right; strict scrutiny should apply.	The rule is a licensing/time‑place‑manner type regulation and should receive intermediate scrutiny.	The court found the rule substantially burdens core Second Amendment conduct and is likely subject to strict scrutiny.
Does the “good reason” requirement survive strict scrutiny and justify denial of a preliminary injunction?	The District must show the law is narrowly tailored to a compelling interest; it cannot simply exclude typical law‑abiding citizens to reduce harms.	The rule serves compelling public‑safety interests by limiting public carrying to those with particularized need and is a balanced approach.	The District failed to show narrow tailoring or least‑restrictive means on the present record; plaintiffs likely to prevail and preliminary injunction granted (permanent injunction denied pending fuller record).

Key Cases Cited

District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (recognizes individual right to keep and bear arms and anchors test for core self‑defense protection)
Heller v. District of Columbia (Heller II), 670 F.3d 1244 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (articulates two‑step Second Amendment framework and means‑end analysis)
McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010) (incorporation of Second Amendment and emphasis on self‑defense as core purpose)
Palmer v. District of Columbia, 59 F. Supp. 3d 173 (D.D.C. 2014) (held total public‑carry ban unconstitutional; recognized public carry as bearing arms)
Peruta v. County of San Diego, 742 F.3d 1144 (9th Cir. 2014) (public carry for self‑defense constitutes bearing arms; persuasive authority)
Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933 (7th Cir. 2012) (right to carry outside the home for self‑defense)
Wrenn v. District of Columbia, 808 F.3d 81 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (procedural history relevant to related challenges and injunction practice)