79 So. 3d 127
Fla. Dist. Ct. App.2012Background
- Goss, a 15-year-old, sued HSA and VisionQuest for negligence over sexual abuse by Brown at Rivendell Youth Ranch.
- HSA contracted VisionQuest in 2004 to assess and advise, with VisionQuest to operate only in an advisory capacity and no joint venture created.
- Brown, employed by VisionQuest, engaged in an inappropriate relationship with Goss and abused him on and off the Ranch; a hotel incident occurred in January 2005.
- Evidence showed conflicting testimony on which entity controlled the Ranch during the incident, and whether VisionQuest or HSA supervised Brown.
- Trial court granted summary judgments for both defendants; the court did not specify grounds; on appeal, the court reviews de novo and distinguishes duty, foreseeability, and vicarious liability.
- Court remanded for further proceedings on the negligence claims, while affirming on the vicarious liability claim against VisionQuest.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Duty owed by HSA to Goss despite delegation | Goss argues HSA retained control and owed a duty to protect him. | HSA contends no duty since it delegated control to VisionQuest and Brown was not its employee. | Duty existed; material facts disputed; summary judgment improper. |
| Foreseeability and proximate cause of harm | HSA/VisionQuest knew or should have known of Brown's inappropriate relationship. | Abuse deemed unforeseeable; liability limited. | Jury must resolve foreseeability and proximate cause given conflicting evidence. |
| Vicarious liability of VisionQuest for Brown's acts | VisionQuest should be liable for Brown’s acts as its employee. | Sexual assaults were outside the course and scope of employment. | Summary judgment affirmed; Brown's acts not within scope or aided by agency; VisionQuest not vicariously liable. |
| Scope of VisionQuest/HSA control over Ranch at time of incident | Either entity could have controlled the Ranch; control affects duties and liability. | Control clearly delineated to VisionQuest per contract. | Conflict in evidence; warrants jury determination; no bar to negligence claim. |
Key Cases Cited
- Williams v. Davis, 974 So.2d 1052 (Fla.2007) (duty elements for negligence; standard of care for facilities)
- Clay Elec. Co-op., Inc. v. Johnson, 873 So.2d 1182 (Fla.2003) (undertaker’s doctrine; standard for duty as to entrants)
- McCain v. Fla. Power Corp., 593 So.2d 500 (Fla.1992) (foreseeable zone of risk; cannot find no duty)
- Sussman v. Fla. E. Coast Props., Inc., 557 So.2d 74 (Fla.3d DCA 1990) (course-and-scope criteria; agent acts within scope)
- Nazareth v. Herndon Ambulance Serv., Inc., 467 So.2d 1076 (Fla.5th DCA 1985) (sexual assaults generally outside scope; exception for agency relation)
- American Home Assurance Co. v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 908 So.2d 459 (Fla.2005) (vicarious liability standards for employer-employee)
- Storm v. Town of Ponce Inlet, 866 So.2d 713 (Fla.5th DCA 2004) (negligent supervision/retention; foreseeability)
- Hardy v. Pier 99 Motor Inn, 664 So.2d 1095 (Fla.1st DCA 1995) (foreseeable injurious conduct by third party)
- Merrill Crossings Assocs. v. McDonald, 705 So.2d 560 (Fla.1997) (negligence where danger should have been anticipated)
- Niece v. Elmview Group Home, 929 P.2d 420 (Wash.1997) (sexual assault not unforeseeable within field of danger)