Gorman v. Covidien, LLC
146 F. Supp. 3d 509
S.D.N.Y.2015Background
- John Gorman, a veteran and former Covidien sales employee, worked at Covidien from 2001 with various roles and was promoted to Territory Manager in April 2013 reporting to Dale Kelly.
- Prior discipline and performance plans: earlier Final Written Warning (pre-2009), a Coaching Plan (2011) which Gorman completed, and customer/colleague complaints in 2013 (Stony Brook hospital, Care Area Specialist, and a marketing VP) about his professionalism and client relationships.
- After internal complaints and a ride-along report, management placed Gorman on a 90-day Performance Improvement Plan (PIP) on June 7, 2013; the PIP emphasized professionalism and supervisory oversight.
- Gorman filed internal discrimination complaints in June 2013 alleging anti-veteran and anti-disabled comments by Kelly; HR investigated, found the complaints unsubstantiated, and removed Kelly from direct oversight of the PIP.
- Gorman took medical leave, was diagnosed with PTSD by a psychologist, suffered a one-time large commission levy tied to customer credits, resigned in September 2013, and sued Covidien and Kelly under NYSHRL, NYCHRL, and for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether placement on PIP and related acts constitute discrimination under NYSHRL (veteran) | Gorman contends PIP, removal from account, and hostile conduct show discrimination based on veteran status | Covidien contends PIP and other acts were nondiscriminatory performance-management responses; PIP not materially adverse | Granted for defendants — Gorman failed to show a materially adverse action or inference of discrimination under NYSHRL |
| Whether placement on PIP and related acts constitute disability discrimination under NYSHRL (PTSD) | Gorman asserts Kelly perceived him as disabled and PIP resulted from that perception | Defendants argue they were unaware of any disability at the time and provided legitimate reasons for PIP | Granted for defendants — plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie ADA/NYSHRL claim (no materially adverse action) |
| Whether disability discrimination claim survives under NYCHRL | Gorman argues NYCHRL’s broader standard covers the PIP and Kelly’s alleged comments showing perceived disability | Defendants argue legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons and investigation purge any animus | Denied as to NYCHRL disability claim — triable issue whether Kelly perceived Gorman as disabled and whether that played some motivating role; employer liability imputed under NYCHRL |
| Whether retaliation (NYSHRL & NYCHRL) and IIED claims survive summary judgment | Gorman asserts subsequent hostile calls, commission levy, and account removal were retaliatory and that defendants’ conduct supports IIED | Defendants argue PIP preceded the protected complaints, calls were not materially adverse/retaliatory, levy and account issues unrelated or occurred earlier; IIED threshold not met | Summary judgment granted for defendants on retaliation claims and IIED — actions not causally retaliatory or sufficiently outrageous |
Key Cases Cited
- Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (summary judgment burden allocation)
- Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242 (summary judgment standard and genuine issue test)
- McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (burden-shifting framework for discrimination claims)
- Mihalik v. Credit Agricole Cheuvreux N. Am., Inc., 715 F.3d 102 (NYCHRL construed broadly in favor of plaintiffs)
- Zakrzewska v. New School, 14 N.Y.3d 469 (NYCHRL employer liability standards)
- Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (affirmative defense and tangible employment action principles)
- Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (same as Ellerth)
- Tomka v. Seiler Corp., 66 F.3d 1295 (individual liability under NYSHRL/aiding-and-abetting discussion)
- Feingold v. New York, 366 F.3d 138 (individual participation standard for NYSHRL liability)
- Gallo v. Prudential Residential Servs., 22 F.3d 1219 (circumstantial proof of discriminatory intent)
