Gordon v. Estate of Brooks, 242 Ariz. 440

Background

In 2007 Mark R. Gordon contracted to buy a house; the purchase contract listed the seller as “George Brooks” and was signed by Sheri Sanborne and Maribel Maza (who were personal representatives of George Brooks’ estate) but did not identify the estate or state they were signing in a representative capacity.
Gordon closed escrow, received a deed showing Sanborne and Maza as Co‑Personal Representatives, and later alleged defects and breaches of warranty and contract by Sanborne and Maza.
Sanborne and Maza closed the probate estate, filed closing statements, and the probate court denied Gordon’s motion to reopen the estate; this court affirmed that denial in a separate decision (Gordon I).
Gordon sued in superior court asserting claims against the Estate and against Sanborne and Maza in both representative and individual capacities; the superior court dismissed the complaint on statute‑of‑limitations and claim‑preclusion grounds.
On appeal Gordon abandoned his estate/administration claims and argued only that Sanborne and Maza are personally liable on the purchase contract and that those personal‑liability claims are neither time‑barred nor claim‑precluded.
The Court of Appeals affirmed dismissal of the estate/administration claims, reversed dismissal of the personal‑liability claims, and remanded for further proceedings limited to the personal‑liability claims.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Sanborne and Maza are shielded from personal liability as personal representatives because they failed to identify the estate in the purchase contract	Gordon: because the contract did not disclose the estate or that they were acting in a representative capacity, they are individually liable	Sanborne & Maza: contract listed seller as George Brooks and they signed it; deed and later probate filings gave notice of representative status	Held: A.R.S. §14‑3808(A) requires revealing representative capacity and identifying the estate in the contract; failure to do so (post‑contract disclosures are too late) means they are not protected from individual liability
Whether probate limitation statutes (A.R.S. §§14‑3803(C), 14‑3933, 14‑3935) bar Gordon’s claims against Sanborne and Maza individually	Gordon: the probate time limits apply only to claims against the estate or to claims in a representative capacity, not to independent personal contract claims	Sanborne & Maza: probate time bars and the six‑month closing‑statement limitation should bar the claims	Held: Probate time limits apply to estate or representative claims; they do not bar personal‑capacity contract claims here (statutes inapplicable to personal liability claims asserted outside representative capacity)
Whether claim preclusion bars the personal‑liability claims because probate court previously rejected claims against the estate	Gordon: prior probate adjudication concerned claims against the estate/personal representatives in fiduciary capacity; he now sues Sanborne and Maza individually	Sanborne & Maza: the probate denial adjudicated claims and therefore precludes relitigation	Held: Claim preclusion does not apply where the same persons litigated in a different capacity; prior probate rulings binding in that capacity do not preclude separate individual‑capacity claims

Key Cases Cited

Ader v. Estate of Felger, 240 Ariz. 32 (Ariz. Ct. App.) (discusses estate representation and how claims against estate proceed through personal representative)
Tovrea v. Nolan, 178 Ariz. 485 (App. 1994) (A.R.S. §14‑3935 six‑month limitation applies to claims against personal representatives in representative capacity, not to other capacities)
Purbaugh v. Jurgensmeier, 483 N.W.2d 757 (Neb. 1992) (UPC §3‑808/A.R.S. §14‑3808(A) requires disclosure of representative capacity and identification of the estate in the contract; mere initials or post‑contract deed insufficient)
Clark v. Amoco Prod. Co., 794 F.2d 967 (5th Cir. 1986) (party who litigates in one capacity is not bound by claim preclusion when later litigating in a different capacity)
Pettit v. Pettit, 218 Ariz. 529 (App. 2008) (describes elements of claim preclusion)
Vance v. Myers’ Estate, 494 P.2d 816 (Alaska 1972) (historical common‑law rule that personal representative was personally liable on contracts when estate not identified)