Slip Opinion
S.D.N.Y.2022Background
- Plaintiff Jermaine Gordon, a pretrial detainee, sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging failure to protect him from an August 19, 2017 assault by other inmates at Rikers Island. Defendants: Correction Officers Oral Drummond and Latoya Jackson, and the City of New York.
- At the time of the attack Gordon slept in an open dorm (West 17B Lower); Drummond was assigned to supervise that area but left the post (went into the “bubble” restroom) and Jackson supervised nearby.
- An inmate (Bilal) allegedly told Gordon that Jackson disclosed Gordon’s homosexuality and pending child-molestation charge and that Drummond had permitted inmates to assault a homosexual inmate; Drummond later allegedly told Gordon he knew an assault on a homosexual was planned but said he did not know Gordon was the target.
- Defendants moved for summary judgment. Magistrate Judge Gorenstein recommended granting summary judgment as to Jackson and the City and denying it as to Drummond; Drummond objected.
- The district court overruled Drummond’s objections, adopted the Report, granted summary judgment for Jackson and the City, and denied summary judgment for Drummond. The court found genuine factual disputes on administrative exhaustion and that a reasonable juror could find Drummond acted with deliberate indifference such that qualified immunity does not apply.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Administrative exhaustion | Gordon says he filed grievances (initial returned for staff references, he edited and pursued appeals) and completed the grievance process | Defendants say DOC records show no grievances were filed related to the assault | Genuine dispute: DOC records incomplete; defendants failed to meet burden to prove non-exhaustion; factual issue remains |
| Failure-to-protect — serious conditions of confinement | Gordon’s unprovoked beating (punched, kicked, stomped until unconscious and bleeding; required medical care) shows per se substantial risk of harm | Drummond contends injuries were not the type (e.g., slashing) that establish a per se risk | Held for plaintiff on issue of triable fact: injuries were sufficiently serious to show dangerous conditions |
| Failure-to-protect — mens rea (deliberate indifference) | Gordon points to Drummond’s admission he knew a homosexual inmate would be attacked, Drummond’s awareness that such inmates are at higher risk, Drummond left his post and took no steps to mitigate risk | Drummond argues he lacked knowledge that Gordon specifically was at substantial risk and that any omission was mere negligence because Gordon did not explicitly tell him he feared attack | Held: admissible evidence could support that Drummond acted recklessly/deliberately indifferent; reasonable juror could find mens rea present |
| Qualified immunity | Gordon says the right not to be left exposed to known substantial risk was clearly established (Farmer/Darnell/Morales) | Drummond contends law was not clearly established as to his conduct and that precedent does not make his specific acts unlawful | Held: qualified immunity denied at summary judgment — the law was sufficiently clearly established such that a reasonable officer would understand the conduct violated detainee rights |
Key Cases Cited
- Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242 (1986) (summary judgment standard; genuine issue if reasonable jury could return verdict for nonmovant)
- Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986) (nonmovant must present specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial)
- Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994) (prison official liable if he knows of and disregards substantial risk to inmate safety)
- Darnell v. Pineiro, 849 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 2017) (pretrial detainee claim: liability for reckless failure to mitigate known substantial risk to health and safety under Fourteenth Amendment)
- Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987) (qualified immunity: right must be clearly established so reasonable official understands conduct is unlawful)
- District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577 (2018) (clearly established law requires precedent sufficiently specific that reasonable official would know conduct unlawful)
- Tangreti v. Bachmann, 983 F.3d 609 (2d Cir. 2020) (supervisory liability requires subjective knowledge of risk)
- Jeffreys v. City of New York, 426 F.3d 549 (2d Cir. 2005) (courts should not weigh credibility on summary judgment)
- Grullon v. City of New Haven, 720 F.3d 133 (2d Cir. 2013) (failure to exhaust is an affirmative defense; defendants bear burden of proving non-exhaustion)
- Hubbs v. Suffolk County Sheriff’s Dep’t, 788 F.3d 54 (2d Cir. 2015) (defendants bear burden to prove non-exhaustion)
- United States v. Snow, 462 F.3d 55 (2d Cir. 2006) (clear-error standard explanation)