Goodwin v. Buchanan, 5:19-cv-00888

Goodwin was indicted on multiple counts including rape and gross sexual imposition; he pled guilty to two amended rape counts and three gross-sexual-imposition counts; other counts were dismissed.
Before sentencing Goodwin filed a pro se motion to withdraw his guilty plea, stating he wanted to go to trial “to find out the truth.” The trial court denied the motion and sentenced him to 25 years plus post-release control, and classified him as a Tier III sex offender.
Goodwin appealed; the Ohio Eleventh District affirmed. The Ohio Supreme Court declined jurisdiction.
Goodwin filed a federal habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 arguing the trial court’s denial of his pre-sentence motion to withdraw his plea violated his Sixth Amendment/right to trial, and also alleging ineffective assistance of counsel based on counsel’s conduct at the withdrawal hearing.
The magistrate judge concluded the plea-withdrawal claim is not cognizable on federal habeas review and the Strickland-based ineffective-assistance claim was not exhausted in state court and is procedurally defaulted; recommended denial of the petition and denial of a certificate of appealability.

Issue	Goodwin's Argument	Buchanan's Argument	Held
Whether denial of pre-sentence motion to withdraw guilty plea violated federal constitutional rights	Goodwin: his reason (wanting a trial to find the truth) was reasonable and the court should have allowed withdrawal	Respondent: there is no federal due-process right to withdraw a plea; absent a constitutional defect in plea-taking the denial is a state-law matter	Denial of the withdrawal motion is not cognizable on federal habeas because Goodwin did not allege a constitutional defect in the taking of his plea
Whether Goodwin’s ineffective-assistance claim (counsel’s conduct at withdrawal hearing) was exhausted	Goodwin: counsel was ineffective for permitting his testimony and for counsel’s remarks at the hearing	Respondent: the ineffective-assistance theory was not presented to state courts under the same theory; appellate brief raised a different theory	Claim was not exhausted and is procedurally defaulted; Goodwin did not show cause and prejudice or miscarriage of justice
Whether the petition merits a certificate of appealability	Goodwin: alleges constitutional violations warranting review	Respondent: claims are non-cognizable or defaulted and thus not a substantial showing of denial of constitutional right	COA should be denied because reasonable jurists would not find the assessment debatable

Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (2011) (AEDPA deference standard and difficulty of obtaining federal habeas relief)
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000) (definition of "contrary to" and "unreasonable application" under § 2254(d))
Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797 (1991) ("look-through" presumption for unexplained state-court orders)
Wilson v. Sellers, 138 S. Ct. 1188 (2018) (confirming look-through rule in federal habeas review)
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (governing standard for ineffective assistance of counsel)
Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991) (procedural-default doctrine and exceptions)
O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838 (1999) (exhaustion requires presentation of claims to the state’s highest court)
Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62 (1991) (federal habeas does not reexamine state-law determinations)
Burt v. Titlow, 571 U.S. 12 (2013) (§ 2254(d)(2) requires unreasonable factual determination to overturn state-court factual findings)