Goodman v. Coronado Student Loan Trust, 0:21-cv-02648

Goodman took student loans 2008–2011 for personal purposes; loans originally owned by Education Management Corporation and later assigned to Coronado.
AES (servicer) and PHEAA (AES’s parent) administered the loans and collections; AES records show it began servicing Goodman’s loan as early as 2012.
Goodman defaulted on her loans and voluntarily filed Chapter 13 bankruptcy on November 22, 2019; lenders did not appear in the bankruptcy and claims filed on their behalf were disallowed.
After the bankruptcy disallowance, Defendants continued collection activity; Goodman sued asserting one count under the FDCPA against Coronado, AES, and PHEAA.
AES and PHEAA moved to dismiss, arguing they are not "debt collectors" under 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6) because AES began servicing the loan before it was in default.
The court found the earliest record-supported default date was July 2019, but AES was servicing the loan well before that date; accordingly AES (and vicariously PHEAA) are not FDCPA debt collectors and were dismissed with prejudice.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether AES/PHEAA are "debt collectors" under the FDCPA	Goodman: AES/PHEAA began collection after loan was in default (late fees July 2019), so they are debt collectors	AES/PHEAA: AES began servicing the loan prior to any default, so it is not a debt collector under §1692a(6)	Court: AES began servicing before earliest possible default (records show service since 2012); not a debt collector — claim dismissed
Whether PHEAA is liable via respondeat superior for AES’s conduct	Goodman: PHEAA is vicariously liable as AES’s parent	PHEAA: Parent cannot be liable if AES is not a debt collector	Court: Because AES is not a debt collector, PHEAA cannot be held liable under respondeat superior — dismissed

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (plausibility pleading standard)
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (pleading must state a plausible claim)
De Dios v. Int’l Realty & Inv., 641 F.3d 1071 (9th Cir. 2011) (construing when a debt is "in default")
Alibrandi v. Fin. Outsourcing Servs., Inc., 333 F.3d 82 (2d Cir. 2003) (distinguishing default from merely outstanding debt)
Schriener v. Quicken Loans, Inc., 774 F.3d 442 (8th Cir. 2014) (court may consider materials embraced by the pleadings on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion)
Munro v. Lucy Activewear, Inc., 899 F.3d 585 (8th Cir. 2018) (leave to amend may be denied as futile when amendment cannot cure defects)