Goodell v. Williams, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 14162

Goodell was convicted in Lucas County, Ohio in 2002 of rape, two counts of aggravated burglary, and two counts of felonious assault for offenses on October 31, 2000.
Judge Lanzinger sentenced Goodell in 2002 to 9 years total, with 5 years for rape and 4 years for others consecutive to the rape term.
Ohio appellate reversal in 2004 required remand for proper justification of consecutive sentences.
On remand (2005), Judge Cook imposed a harsher 16-year sentence with three crime groups and specified consecutive terms.
Goodell's challenge argued vindictiveness; appellate court declined presumptive vindictiveness; later, a second resentencing (2006) produced 13 years, and Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed in 2007.
Goodell filed a habeas petition in 2008; district court granted relief on presumption of vindictiveness, but the Sixth Circuit reversed, holding no presumption or rebuttal supported by federal law.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether a presumption of vindictiveness applies here	Goodell argues Pearce applies due to harsher sentence after relief.	Warden argues presumption does not apply because different sentencers and McCullough tailor Pearce.	Presumption does not apply.
Whether the presumption was rebutted by the record	Goodell contends no objective reasons were offered for increased sentence.	Cook provided objective reasons tied to history and offense; record supports increase.	Presumption not applicable; no merit to rebuttal under state decision.
Whether Ohio Court of Appeals' ruling was contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law	District court held state ruling contrary to Pearce/McCullough line.	State court properly applied McCullough to reject presumption when different sentencers imposed sentence.	Ohio court’s ruling was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law.
Whether there was actual vindictiveness	Arguments of vindictiveness were not rebutted by evidence.	Judge Cook's reasons show nonvindictive, objective rationale for increased sentence.	No actual vindictiveness found.

North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969) (presumption against vindictiveness when resentencing and retrial occur)
Texas v. McCullough, 475 U.S. 134 (1986) (limits Pearce presumption; different sentencers can negate presumption; may rely on objective reasons)
Goodwin v. United States, 457 U.S. 368 (1982) (presumption requires objective justification for increased sentence)
Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794 (1989) (presumption applies only where reasonable likelihood of vindictiveness)
Moon v. Maryland, 398 U.S. 319 (1970) (Pearce not applicable when defendant concedes; no vindictiveness)
Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104 (1972) ( Pearce not needed where second trial does not involve same framework)
Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17 (1973) ( Pearce foundations; usefulness in assessing vindictiveness)
Wasman v. United States, 468 U.S. 559 (1984) (presumption may be shaped by on-record vindicating reasons)
Gauntlett v. Kelley, 849 F.2d 217 (1988) (recognizes limits of Pearce presumption when different sentencers)
United States v. Rodriguez, 602 F.3d 346 (2010) (circuit industry view on vindictiveness and multiple sentencers)