321 P.3d 655
Haw.2014Background
- Maui Lani Project District (MLPD) had Phase I (ordinance), Phase II (preliminary plat), and Phase III (final plat) approvals; pre-1991 CZO defined building height as from finished grade, 1991 Ordinance 2031 changed definition to measure from natural or finished grade, whichever is lower (more restrictive).
- Developers filled project lots (Sandhills and Fairways), raising finished grades; County Planning Director initially rescinded Phase III approval for Sandhills due to potential height violations; developers met with the Mayor who orally agreed — later confirmed in writing — to measure height from finished grade for projects that had Phase I/II prior to 9/4/1991; Phase III approvals then issued.
- Homeowners sued County and developers (Counts I-II) seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to enforce the post-1991 height definition; circuit court granted partial summary judgment (12/31/2008) declaring MLPD subject to the 1991 height definition and enjoining issuance of building permits inconsistent with it (injunction limited to Sandhills and Fairways).
- Homeowners sought attorney’s fees under the private attorney general doctrine; the circuit court denied fees and the ICA later affirmed that denial.
- While appeals were pending, County Council enacted Ordinance 3848 (amending the CZO to require finished-grade measurement for project districts that had Phase II before 9/4/1991), effectively mooting the main controversy; the ICA vacated the circuit court’s declaratory/injunctive judgment and remanded for dismissal but affirmed the denial of fees.
- The Hawai‘i Supreme Court held the ICA erred to the extent it vacated the trial-court judgment without first remanding to the trial court to permit factfinding and an HRCP Rule 60(b) analysis; the denial of attorney’s fees was affirmed (Homeowners failed the third private-attorney-general prong).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether appellate court should vacate trial-court declaratory/injunctive judgment after appellate mootness caused by subsequent ordinance | Goo: County caused mootness by lobbying/settling; vacatur is inappropriate where defendant voluntarily mooted the case; declaratory judgment should remain as vindication | County/Developers: Ordinance mooted the appeal; vacatur appropriate to prevent collateral estoppel and enable building under new law | Vacatur inappropriate as initial appellate disposition; appellate court should, absent extraordinary circumstances, remand to trial court to allow Rule 60(b)/equitable factfinding whether vacatur is warranted; ICA erred by vacating without remand |
| Standard and burden for appellate vacatur when case is mooted on appeal | Goo: Equity favors plaintiffs if defendants' actions caused mootness | County: legislative action by Council is independent; mootness akin to happenstance; vacatur proper | Court: Bancorp presumption against vacatur when losing party voluntarily causes mootness; but because vacatur inquiries are fact-intensive, appellate courts should remand to trial court first for factual/equitable determination absent exceptional circumstances |
| Whether homewoners are entitled to attorney’s fees under the private attorney general doctrine | Goo: Case vindicated rule of law, benefitted broad Maui public and future owners; fees necessary to encourage private enforcement | County/ICA: Relief was limited in scope; number of beneficiaries unclear/limited; failure to satisfy prongs | Held: Affirmed denial — Homeowners failed third prong (number of people benefitted/general precedential value), so fees denied |
| Proper remedy when case becomes moot on appeal and potential preclusive effects exist | Goo: Keep declaratory judgment; vacatur would erase vindication | County/Developers: Vacatur avoids unfair preclusion against developers and allows economic activity | Held: Trial court should evaluate whether vacatur is equitable (Rule 60(b) analysis); appellate courts should remand absent extraordinary circumstances; wholesale appellate vacatur without remand was error |
Key Cases Cited
- U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall P’ship, 513 U.S. 18 (1994) (vacatur is extraordinary; parties who voluntarily moot a case by settlement ordinarily forfeit entitlement to vacatur; appellate courts must consider public interest)
- United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36 (1950) (remedy of vacatur clears unreviewable judgments that became moot through happenstance)
- Am. Games, Inc. v. Trade Prods., Inc., 142 F.3d 1164 (9th Cir. 1998) (district court remand for fact-intensive equitable inquiry on vacatur appropriate where mootness arose by business transaction/merger)
- Sierra Club v. Dep’t of Transp. of State of Hawai‘i (Superferry II), 120 Hawai‘i 181, 202 P.3d 1226 (2009) (private attorney general doctrine applied where decision produced generally applicable law and broad public benefit)
- Keahole Defense Coal. v. Bd. of Land & Natural Res., 110 Hawai‘i 419, 134 P.3d 585 (2006) (discussion of appellate vs trial-court roles in vacatur analysis and equitable discretion of trial courts)