Gonzalez v. United States
792 F.3d 232
2d Cir.2015Background
- Efrain Gonzalez Jr., convicted after guilty plea of fraud and conspiracy, was sentenced May 25, 2010; district court deferred exact restitution amount and later ordered $122,775 on Aug. 23, 2010.
- Gonzalez appealed; the Second Circuit (July 22, 2011) affirmed the conviction and sentence but vacated the restitution order and remanded for recalculation (finding $122,775 overstated victim losses).
- On remand the parties agreed to a 25% reduction, and the district court entered a revised restitution order for $92,081.25 on March 6, 2013; Gonzalez did not appeal that order.
- Gonzalez filed a pro se 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion on Sept. 4, 2013 alleging government misconduct; the district court dismissed it as untimely, holding the AEDPA one-year clock began 90 days after the July 2011 decision (Oct. 20, 2011).
- Gonzalez appealed; the Second Circuit granted COA on whether a § 2255 motion filed within one year of the revised restitution order is timely where restitution was recalculated on remand.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| When does the AEDPA one‑year limitations period for § 2255 begin where an appellate court affirms conviction but vacates and remands for recalculation of restitution? | Limitations period begins after the district court enters the revised restitution order (i.e., when the new judgment is final). | Limitations period began when the court of appeals affirmed the conviction and non‑restitution sentence (i.e., when time for certiorari expired). | The AEDPA clock begins only when the revised restitution order becomes final. |
Key Cases Cited
- Magwood v. Patterson, 561 U.S. 320 (2010) (second habeas petition challenging a new judgment is not "successive" under AEDPA)
- Johnson v. United States, 623 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 2010) (application of Magwood to federal § 2255 amended judgments)
- United States v. Colvin, 204 F.3d 1221 (9th Cir. 2000) (AEDPA clock starts with revised federal judgment after remand)
- United States v. Dodson, 291 F.3d 268 (4th Cir. 2002) (limitations period begins after resentencing on remand where remand led to substantive proceedings)
- Burwell v. United States, 467 F.3d 160 (2d Cir. 2006) (distinguishing ministerial re‑entry of judgment from substantive remand work for AEDPA finality)
- Pasquantino v. United States, 544 U.S. 349 (2005) (restitution as criminal punishment)
- Clay v. United States, 537 U.S. 522 (2003) (finality of conviction for certiorari timing)
- Corey v. United States, 375 U.S. 169 (1963) (appealable interim judgments and subsequent final sentencing)
- Kaminski v. United States, 339 F.3d 84 (2d Cir. 2003) (limits on collateral attack of non‑custodial sentence components; restitution could in rare cases amount to custody)