Gonzalez v. Hasty, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 12605

Gonzalez, an inmate at MCC, was confined to SHU from Feb 28, 1999, and later transferred to MDC on July 24, 2001, remaining in SHU there for about 10 months.
Gonzalez alleges administrative detention in SHU (non-punitive) with restricted privileges and mandatory handcuffs, and claims failure to conduct proper segregation reviews and meaningful psychological assessments.
He filed a pro se Bivens action on May 31, 2005, asserting violations of First, Fifth, and Eighth Amendments across MCC (Manhattan) and MDC (Brooklyn) facilities; he alleged a conspiracy by Warden Hasty and staff.
Gonzalez contends he exhausted administrative remedies on Aug 8, 2002, and invokes the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement to toll the statute of limitations.
The district court dismissed MCC claims as untimely (three-year NY statute) and MDC claims for improper venue, and did not address tolling; the court also noted venue issues for MDC.
The Second Circuit vacated and remanded, holding tolling during administrative exhaustion may apply under PLRA and instructing reconsideration of both the timeliness and venue issues on remand.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether tolling applies during inmate exhaustion under PLRA.	Gonzalez argues tolling is available during exhaustion per circuit practice.	Defendants contend tolling should not extend beyond exhaustion period or at all without record of start date.	Remand to determine start of exhaustion and applicability of tolling.
Whether MCC claims are timely given potential exhaustion tolling.	If tolling applies, MCC claims may be timely.	Without clear exhaustion start date, timeliness cannot be assured.	Remand to ascertain exhaustion initiation date and timeliness.
Whether the MDC claims were improperly venued and should be transferred.	MDC claims arise from events in Brooklyn; venue proper or transfer appropriate.	MDC venue improper in SDNY; transfer may be required or case dismissed.	Remand with possible transfer to EDNY if proper on reexamination.
Whether continuing violation doctrine aggregates MCC and MDC claims for timeliness purposes.	Continuing violation could render earlier MCC/ongoing MDC conduct timely.	Court should not aggregate different conspiracies across facilities without clear overlap.	Court declines to decide aggregation on record; remand to address.
Whether the district court should grant dismissal on alternative conspiracy grounds if needed.	Not directly addressed here.	Conspiracy claims lack specificity and should be dismissed on other grounds if necessary.	Conspiracy claims may be dismissed on remand if appropriate; decision deferred.

Brown v. Valoff, 422 F.3d 926 (9th Cir. 2005) (tolling during exhaustion recognized)
Clifford v. Gibbs, 298 F.3d 328 (5th Cir. 2002) (exhaustion tolling recognized)
Johnson v. Rivera, 272 F.3d 519 (7th Cir. 2001) (exhaustion tolling recognized)
Brown v. Morgan, 209 F.3d 595 (6th Cir. 2000) (tolling during exhaustion period)
Abney v. McGinnis, 380 F.3d 663 (2d Cir. 2004) (PLRA exhaustion tolling recognition)
Moreno-Bravo v. Gonzales, 463 F.3d 253 (2d Cir. 2006) (venue and transfer considerations; compounding factors)
Daniel v. American Board of Emergency Medicine, 428 F.3d 408 (2d Cir. 2005) (abrogation of transfer discretion; compelling reasons for transfer)
Harris v. Hegmann, 198 F.3d 153 (5th Cir. 1999) (exhaustion tolling considered in context)
Shomo v. City of New York, 579 F.3d 176 (2d Cir. 2009) (continuing violation doctrine applied to §1983 claims)
Kronisch v. United States, 150 F.3d 112 (2d Cir. 1998) (NY courts apply three-year statute for Bivens)
Gulf Ins. Co. v. Glasbrenner, 417 F.3d 353 (2d Cir. 2005) (venue burden on prima facie case; de novo review)
Gonzalez v. Hasty, 2007 WL 914238 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (district court on exhaustion/venue; remand guidance)