Gonzalez v. Google LLC
598 U.S. 617
SCOTUS2023Background
- In 2015 ISIS terrorists carried out coordinated attacks in Paris, killing 130, including U.S. citizen Nohemi Gonzalez.
- Gonzalez’s parents and brothers sued Google under 18 U.S.C. §2333(a) (direct liability) and §2333(d)(2) (secondary liability via aiding-and-abetting and conspiracy), alleging YouTube’s role in ISIS’s recruitment and propaganda.
- The District Court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim; plaintiffs appealed and stood on the complaint.
- The Ninth Circuit largely affirmed, holding §230 barred most claims but left open narrow claims based on alleged ad-approval and revenue-sharing; it nonetheless concluded those remaining allegations failed to state viable claims.
- The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the Ninth Circuit’s application of §230 but, after deciding Twitter, Inc. v. Taamneh, concluded plaintiffs’ secondary-liability allegations materially mirror those in Taamneh and likely fail on their merits independent of §230.
- The Court vacated the Ninth Circuit’s judgment and remanded for consideration in light of the Court’s decision in Taamneh, declining to resolve §230’s application here.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether CDA §230 immunizes plaintiffs’ claims against Google | §230 does not bar claims because Google’s conduct (recommendations, hosting, monetization) goes beyond content provider immunity | §230 shields Google from liability for third-party content and interactive service provider actions | Court declined to decide §230’s application and remanded for reconsideration in light of Twitter/Taamneh because the complaint likely fails on the merits independent of §230 |
| Whether plaintiffs stated an aiding-and-abetting claim under 18 U.S.C. §2333(d)(2) | Google knowingly provided substantial assistance to ISIS via YouTube’s hosting, algorithms, and monetization | Google’s services did not constitute knowing, substantial assistance to ISIS’s terrorist acts | Supreme Court’s decision in Taamneh indicates materially identical allegations fail to state aiding-and-abetting; Court remanded for Ninth Circuit to apply that decision |
| Whether plaintiffs pleaded a conspiracy with ISIS (§2333(d)(2)) | Revenue-sharing and ad-approval allegations show an agreement or concerted action with ISIS | No plausible allegation that Google reached an agreement with ISIS | Ninth Circuit held plaintiffs did not plausibly allege an agreement; Supreme Court left that unchallenged on review |
| Whether plaintiffs pleaded direct liability under §2333(a) (intent element) | Google’s conduct intended to intimidate/coerce or influence government by facilitating ISIS propaganda | Google lacked the requisite intent to further terrorism | Ninth Circuit found plaintiffs failed to allege the required terrorist intent; Supreme Court did not disturb that unchallenged holding |
Key Cases Cited
- Gonzalez v. Google, 2 F.4th 871 (9th Cir. 2021) (Ninth Circuit consolidated opinion addressing Gonzalez and Twitter; held §230 bars most claims but allowed limited revenue-sharing theory while finding pleaded allegations insufficient to state claims)