282 F. Supp. 3d 1150
N.D. Cal.2017Background
- Plaintiffs (family of a Paris attack victim) sued Google alleging YouTube enabled ISIS recruitment, propaganda, and operational planning, contributing to terrorist acts abroad.
- Plaintiffs pleaded claims under the Antiterrorism Act (ATA) and federal statutes prohibiting material support to terrorists.
- Google moved to dismiss under Section 230(c)(1) of the Communications Decency Act (CDA), arguing it shields interactive computer service providers from liability for third-party content.
- Plaintiffs argued JASTA repealed or limited Section 230 immunity, and that Section 230 does not apply extraterritorially to conduct outside the U.S.
- The court considered (1) whether JASTA impliedly repealed Section 230, (2) whether Section 230 applies extraterritorially, and (3) whether Plaintiffs’ claims treat Google as a publisher or show Google was an information content provider.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether JASTA repealed Section 230 | JASTA's purpose („broadest possible basis") shows Congress intended to abrogate statutory immunities including §230 | JASTA does not reference §230 and expressly amended only FSIA/ATA where intended | JASTA did not repeal §230; repeal by implication not shown |
| Whether §230 applies extraterritorially | §230 cannot shield conduct that occurred abroad (ISIS activity, attacks, and support occurred outside U.S.) | §230 contains no clear extraterritorial statement but its focus is limiting liability where suit is brought (U.S. litigation) | §230 can be applied domestically to bar claims in U.S. litigation; presumption against extraterritoriality not defeat §230 here |
| Whether Plaintiffs seek to treat Google as publisher/speaker | Claims challenge provision of platform/tools and alleged material support, not publication of third‑party content | Plaintiffs’ theory depends on ISIS content and Google’s publishing/editorial decisions (account access, removal) | Claims inherently require treating Google as publisher/speaker; §230(c)(1) bars liability |
| Whether Google is an "information content provider" | Targeted ads, revenue sharing, and platform functions amount to development of content or materially contributed to unlawfulness | Google did not create or materially contribute to ISIS video content; tools/ads are content‑neutral and do not make content unlawful | Google is not alleged to have materially developed ISIS videos; §230(f)(3) exception inapplicable; §230(c)(1) immunity applies |
Key Cases Cited
- Internet Brands, Inc. v. Myspace, Inc., 824 F.3d 846 (9th Cir. 2016) (Section 230 does not create general immunity for third‑party content)
- Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096 (9th Cir. 2009) (test for whether claim treats defendant as publisher or speaker)
- Roommates.com, LLC v. City of San Francisco, 521 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2008) ("material contribution" standard for information content provider)
- Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018 (9th Cir. 2003) (Congress chose to treat internet intermediaries differently to promote free speech and e‑commerce)
- Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2003) (critical inquiry is whether site acted as information content provider for the information at issue)
- Cohen v. Facebook, Inc., 252 F. Supp. 3d 140 (E.D.N.Y. 2017) (§230 focus is limiting liability where suit is brought; similar rejection of attempt to treat account provision as non‑publisher conduct)
- RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Community, 136 S. Ct. 2090 (U.S. 2016) (two‑step extraterritoriality framework)
- Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997) (legislative purpose of §230 to avoid imposing publisher liability on intermediaries)