Gonzales, Michael Dean
WR-40,541-04
Tex. App.Jun 3, 2015Background
- Michael Dean Gonzales was convicted of capital murder (1995); his death sentence was vacated on federal habeas and he was resentenced to death after a 2009 retrial.
- At the punishment retrial and sentencing proceedings Gonzales behaved disruptively, insisted on testifying, and immediately sought to waive appeals and post-conviction relief, rejecting appointed counsel.
- No initial state Article 11.071 habeas application was filed before the filing deadline; the convicting court reported that Gonzales refused appointed habeas counsel and that his election to proceed pro se was intelligent and voluntary.
- This Court treated Gonzales’s later pro se habeas filing as a subsequent, abusive application under Art. 11.071 § 5(a), concluding he had waived his right to an initial state habeas application.
- Gonzales now alleges he was incompetent to waive state post-conviction proceedings and argues the Court should treat his present application as an initial application rather than subsequent; the dissent urges the Court to address competency before rejecting the application.
- The federal habeas proceedings were stayed pending exhaustion; failure to resolve state competency could affect federal exhaustion and procedural-default litigation and potentially lead to de novo federal review.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Gonzales) | Defendant's Argument (State/Court majority) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Gonzales’s later habeas is an "initial" or a "subsequent" application | Gonzales argues he was incompetent to waive his right to file an initial Article 11.071 application, so the later filing should be treated as initial | Court treated his prior inaction as an intelligent, voluntary waiver, so any later filing is subsequent/abusive under Art. 11.071 § 5(a) | Court (majority) labels application subsequent and rejects it as abusive; dissent urges competency inquiry |
| Whether a habeas waiver requires a competency inquiry | Gonzales: due process requires competency to waive collateral review; no inquiry was made before deadline | Court majority: accepted convicting court’s finding that waiver was intelligent and voluntary; no competency inquiry addressed | Dissent: finds allegations raise bona fide doubt and would order inquiry; majority did not address issue |
| Whether the convicting court complied with Article 11.071 § 2(a)’s hearing/finding requirements | Gonzales: there was no on-the-record finding that his election to proceed pro se was knowingly and voluntarily made | State: convicting court reported he refused counsel and said the election was intelligent and voluntary | Reality: record lacks an express on-the-record colloquy or formal finding; dissent faults the failure to inquire or memorialize competency |
| Federalism/exhaustion consequences of declining to adjudicate competency | Gonzales: failure to resolve competency may lead federal courts to excuse exhaustion or procedural default, producing de novo federal review | State: by treating application as subsequent, state proceedings end and federal courts will address exhaustion/default | Dissent: resolving competency at state level would better protect federalism and could preserve deference if state reaches merits; majority avoided the issue |
Key Cases Cited
- Ex parte Reynoso, 257 S.W.3d 715 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (discusses waiver of state habeas and competence findings)
- Gonzales v. Quarterman, 458 F.3d 384 (5th Cir. 2006) (federal habeas litigation that resulted in resentencing)
- Lopez v. Stephens, 783 F.3d 524 (5th Cir. 2015) (capital habeas waiver requires competency inquiry)
- Mata v. Johnson, 210 F.3d 324 (5th Cir. 2000) (when bona fide doubt of competency exists, court must inquire and may order psychiatric evaluation)
- Rees v. Peyton, 384 U.S. 312 (1966) (standard on capacity to waive collateral review)
- Ex parte Medina, 361 S.W.3d 633 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (one full and fair opportunity for capital post-conviction relief)
- Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012) (ineffective assistance of initial state habeas counsel may constitute cause to excuse default)
