Gomez v. Stop & Shop Supermarket Co., 670 F.3d 395

Gómez, a Colombian national, sued Stop & Shop for a fall in the greeting card aisle in North Andover, MA, claiming a foreign substance caused his slip.
The district court granted summary judgment for Stop & Shop after discovery showed no genuine issue of material fact.
The plaintiff alleged negligence in maintaining the premises under Massachusetts law, including a dangerous condition and the store's notice.
The matter was referred to a magistrate judge; on review, the district court’s grant of summary judgment was affirmed.
Massachusetts premises-liability law requires proof of a dangerous condition and actual or constructive notice; the mode-of-operation rule relaxes notice when self-service operations create foreseeable dangers.
The court held no reasonable jury could find a dangerous condition existed; evidence was speculative, and spoliation claims failed for lack of proof.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Was there a genuine issue of material fact on a dangerous condition?	Gómez argues a dangerous condition existed in the aisle.	Stop & Shop contends no dangerous condition was proven.	No genuine issue; no dangerous condition shown.
Did the mode-of-operation doctrine apply to defeat ordinary notice requirements?	Mode of operation makes foreseeability and failure to act relevant.	Mode follows only when tied to adequate notice; no evidence of danger existed.	Not satisfied; no proof of the condition or notice.
Was there evidence of spoliation or failure to collect evidence that could preclude summary judgment?	Defendant destroyed or failed to preserve video of the accident.	No evidence of spoliation; no policy or actual destruction shown.	No spoliation; no basis to deny summary judgment.

Houlton Citizens' Coalition v. Town of Houlton, 175 F.3d 178 (1st Cir. 1999) (de novo review standard for summary judgment)
Kuperman v. Wrenn, 645 F.3d 69 (1st Cir. 2011) (standard for resolving evidentiary conflicts on summary judgment)
Fithian v. Reed, 204 F.3d 306 (1st Cir. 2000) (summary judgment burden and material facts)
Hannon v. Beard, 645 F.3d 45 (1st Cir. 2011) (conclusory allegations do not defeat summary judgment)
Tropigas de P.R., Inc. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's of London, 637 F.3d 53 (1st Cir. 2011) (speculation insufficient to create a genuine dispute)
McCarthy v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 56 F.3d 313 (1st Cir. 1995) (opposition to summary judgment requires specific facts)
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986) (evidence must be probative and not merely colorable)
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (distinction between possibility and plausibility in pleadings context)
Mack v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 871 F.2d 179 (1st Cir. 1989) (evidence must have substance vs. conjecture)
Sheehan v. Roche Bros. Supermarkets, Inc., 863 N.E.2d 1276 (Mass. 2007) (premises-liability doctrine including dangerous condition and notice)
Oliveri v. MBTA, 292 N.E.2d 863 (Mass. 1973) (traditional notice requirement in premises liability)