Gomez v. Jackson Hewitt, Inc.
427 Md. 128
| Md. | 2012Background
- Gomez filed a CSBA and CPA claim alleging Jackson Hewitt, as a tax preparer, facilitated a RAL and received consideration via the lender, SBBT, through a program agreement with Hewitt entities.
- Program documents show SBBT paid Hewitt a fixed annual fee and Hewitt provided technology and support for the SBBT Program, with fee structures referencing payments to Hewitt affiliates.
- Gomez’s complaint traces a $284 tax preparation fee paid to Hewitt as part of the RAL package, which the CSBA claim characterizes as payment for credit services received from Hewitt.
- Circuit Court dismissed CSBA and CPA claims, concluding CSBA did not apply to RAL facilitators and that Gomez, paying indirectly via the lender, was not a consumer of a CSBA-defined credit services business.
- Court of Special Appeals affirmed, aligning with Gomez that CSBA did not cover RAL facilitators and that 2010 RAL legislation clarified regulation of tax preparers involved in RALs rather than expanding CSBA to cover them.
- This Court granted certiorari to address CSBA applicability to RAL facilitators and whether the 2010 RAL statute repealed or superseded CSBA coverage.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does CSBA apply to a RAL facilitator when payment is indirect? | Gomez argues CSBA applies because the facilitator provides credit-related services in return for compensation, albeit via the lender. | Hewitt contends CSBA requires direct payment from consumer to the credit services business, so no claim arises where payment is indirect. | CSBA does not apply; direct payment is required. |
| Did the 2010 RAL legislation repeal or limit CSBA’s application to RAL facilitators? | CSBA remains applicable; 2010 Act does not repeal CSBA as applied to RALs. | 2010 RAL legislation shows the General Assembly did not intend CSBA to cover RAL facilitators and created separate regulation. | CSBA is not applied to RAL facilitators; 2010 Act confirms separate regulatory framework. |
| Is payment “in return for” credit services satisfied by indirect payment to the facilitator? | Payment can be indirect through the lender; the facilitator still provides credit services for compensation. | Payment must be direct from consumer to the credit services business for CSBA to apply. | Payment must be direct; indirect payment does not satisfy the return-for requirement. |
| Should agency interpretations (Marriott factors) afford deference to the Commissioner on RAL CSBA applicability? | Commissioner’s longstanding interpretations should be given deference. | Commissioner’s interpretations are not longstanding or adversarially developed; deference is limited. | Deference to the Commissioner is not warranted; legislative history evidences broader intent not to apply CSBA to RAL facilitators. |
Key Cases Cited
- Gomez v. Jackson Hewitt, Inc., 198 Md.App. 87 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2011) (CSBA not intended to cover RAL facilitators; legislative history and 2010 RAL act support)
- Brooks v. Hous. Auth., 411 Md. 603 (Md. 2009) (statutory construction: discern purpose via legislative history when language ambiguous)
- Marriott Employees Fed. Credit Union v. Motor Vehicle Admin., 346 Md. 437 (Md. 1997) (deference framework for agency interpretations of statutes)
- Gomez v. Jackson Hewitt, Inc., 198 Md.App. 87 (Md. App. 2011) (discusses CSBA scope and legislative history (see above) )
- Raskin v. H&R Block Eastern Enters., Inc., 591 F.3d 718 (4th Cir. 2010) (federal appellate discussion on CSBA-like issues in related context)
- Midstate Siding & Window Co. v. Rogers, 204 Ill.2d 314 (Ill. 2003) (state CS-like act; requires payment for credit services to trigger coverage)
- Fulik v. Dennis Rourke Corp., 311 Md. 560 (Md. 1988) (illustrative of statutory interpretation principles)