Goldstein v. Secretary of the Commonwealth
142 N.E.3d 560
Mass.2020Background
- In April 2020 three prospective primary candidates filed an emergency petition seeking to enjoin Massachusetts' statutory minimum nominating‑paper signature requirements (G. L. c. 53, §§ 7, 44) as applied to the September 1, 2020 primary, arguing COVID‑19 public‑health restrictions made obtaining in‑person "wet" signatures an unconstitutional burden.
- Statutes require different minimum certified signatures by office (e.g., U.S. Senate 10,000; U.S. House 2,000; State Representative 150) and require signatures to be made "in person as registered," interpreted to require original handwritten signatures.
- The pandemic prompted state emergency orders (notably March 23 limits on gatherings and a stay‑at‑home advisory) that sharply curtailed traditional signature‑gathering venues and increased health risks from person‑to‑person or shared pen contact.
- The Secretary acknowledged the increased burden and conceded strict scrutiny applied; the Legislature had considered but not enacted relief before the court acted.
- The SJC (majority) held the signature rules unconstitutional as applied to the September primary and provided equitable relief limited to that election: (1) a 50% across‑the‑board reduction in required signatures; (2) extension of certain filing deadlines for State district and county candidates to May 5 and June 2 (matching federal/statewide deadlines); and (3) limited authorization to use electronic collection/submission methods subject to practical restrictions.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether statutory minimum signature requirements are unconstitutional as applied during COVID‑19 | In‑person signature requirement imposes an undue, constitutionally significant burden given pandemic restrictions and health risks | Secretary agreed pandemic increases burden and triggers heightened scrutiny but contended broader systemic fixes are legislative | Court: As applied to Sept. 1 primary in pandemic, requirements violate ballot‑access rights; strict scrutiny applies and State cannot justify continuing same requirements |
| Whether complete elimination of signature requirements is required | Goldstein et al. asked to void requirements and place plaintiffs directly on the ballot | Secretary and court: some signature requirement remains a legitimate state interest; elimination is overbroad | Held: Rejection of total voiding; some signature requirement retained but reduced |
| Appropriate numerical remedy (how much reduction, to whom) | Plaintiffs sought "substantial" reduction or elimination; some proposed legislative bills varied | Secretary proposed 50% reduction but limited to offices with ≥1,000 signatures; court: parity across offices is important | Held: 50% reduction across the board for all offices (preserves relative ratios among offices) |
| Deadlines and electronic‑signature accommodations | Plaintiffs sought extended deadlines and authorization of electronic signatures broadly | Secretary warned of ballot‑preparation and military/overseas ballot timelines and limited local tech capacity; proposed limited electronic workflow (post/download/return then submit paper) | Held: Extended filing deadlines for State district/county candidates to May 5 (local) and June 2 (Secretary); allowed limited electronic collection/submission process subject to verification and practical constraints but declined to wholesale convert to full electronic signature system before the election |
Key Cases Cited
- Libertarian Ass'n of Mass. v. Secretary of the Commonwealth, 462 Mass. 538 (2012) (framework for assessing burdens on ballot access and sliding‑scale review)
- Chelsea Collaborative, Inc. v. Secretary of the Commonwealth, 480 Mass. 27 (2018) (discussion of when strict scrutiny applies to voting restrictions)
- Opinion of the Justices, 368 Mass. 819 (1975) (recognition that election regulations may be sustained if reasonably necessary)
- Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, 440 Mass. 309 (2003) (noting that changing circumstances can alter constitutional analysis)
- Barr v. Galvin, 626 F.3d 99 (1st Cir. 2010) (upholding signature requirements as means to ensure demonstrable support)
- Libertarian Party of Me. v. Diamond, 992 F.2d 365 (1st Cir. 1993) (discussing ballot integrity and burdens of overloaded ballots)
- Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (standards for judicial relief where constitutional voting rights are violated)
- Cepulonis v. Secretary of the Commonwealth, 389 Mass. 930 (1983) (judicial remedial authority when legislature fails to cure constitutional defects)