Goldstein Garber & Salama, LLC v. J.B, 300 Ga. 840

Background

J.B. underwent outpatient dental surgery at Goldstein, Garber & Salama, LLC (GGS) where an independent‑contract CRNA, Paul Serdula, administered and maintained her under heavy sedation and left her alone during recovery periods.
Serdula secretly videotaped and sexually assaulted J.B. while she was anesthetized; he later was criminally convicted for assaults on multiple patients and sentenced to life.
Serdula had been placed by an anesthesia staffing agency that conducted independent credentialing; GGS had no prior notice of any propensity by Serdula to commit sexual assaults.
J.B. sued Serdula and GGS, later dismissing claims against Serdula after his conviction and proceeding against GGS for professional negligence and negligence per se (alleging violation of OCGA § 43-11-21.1 permitting rules for administration of general anesthesia).
A jury found for J.B.; the Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of GGS’s directed‑verdict motions. The Georgia Supreme Court granted certiorari to review foreseeability/proximate cause, negligence per se, and apportionment objections.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Serdula’s intervening criminal acts were foreseeable such that GGS’s alleged breaches proximately caused J.B.’s injuries	J.B.: professional failures (oversedation, inadequate supervision, leaving recovering patient unattended) made assault a foreseeable risk and thus proximate cause	GGS: Serdula’s criminal acts were independent intervening acts that were unforeseeable; they break the causal chain	Held: Court reversed — Serdula’s crimes were not reasonably foreseeable as a matter of law; directed verdict should have been granted on proximate cause
Whether denial of directed verdict on negligence per se (violation of OCGA § 43-11-21.1) was correct	J.B.: statutory permitting requirements were violated and exist to protect patients like her; sexual assault falls within the statute’s protection of health, safety, and welfare	GGS: The statute targets medical/anesthesia safety and equipment; it does not contemplate remote, nonmedical harms like sexual assault	Held: Reversed — negligence per se not established because statute was aimed at medical/anesthesia risks, not assaults
Whether the dental‑community awareness that assaults of sedated patients occur made the assaults foreseeable	J.B.: profession’s acknowledgment of such assaults supports foreseeability	GGS: General awareness of rare events does not make a specific contractor’s criminal conduct foreseeable	Held: Court agreed with GGS — general awareness alone does not render these specific crimes reasonably foreseeable
Whether GGS waived objections to jury apportionment of fault	J.B.: argued apportionment was proper	GGS: contested apportionment	Held: Court did not decide waiver because resolution on proximate cause and negligence per se made it unnecessary

Key Cases Cited

Ontario Sewing Machine Co. v. Smith, 275 Ga. 683 (Ga. 2002) (intervening wrongful act does not absolve original wrongdoer if the act was reasonably foreseeable)
Johnson v. American Nat. Red Cross, 276 Ga. 270 (Ga. 2003) (elements of negligence and proximate‑cause limits on liability)
Munroe v. Universal Health Svcs., Inc., 277 Ga. 861 (Ga. 2004) (foreseeability of employee tendencies and when foreseeability is a question for the court)
Central Anesthesia v. Worthy, 254 Ga. 728 (Ga. 1985) (negligence per se supplies duty and breach but proximate cause still required)
Murphy v. Bajjani, 282 Ga. 197 (Ga. 2007) (elements required to establish negligence per se)