Golden v. California Emergency Physicians Medical Group, 782 F.3d 1083

Dr. Donald Golden sued California Emergency Physicians (CEP) after losing staff privileges and reached an oral settlement in court that included a broad no‑employment provision barring him from working for CEP or at facilities CEP owns or contracts with now or in the future.
The magistrate reduced terms to writing; Golden refused to sign and resisted enforcement; his former counsel (seeking a contingency fee) moved to enforce the written settlement.
The district court adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendation and ordered Golden to sign/enforced the settlement; Golden appealed and the Ninth Circuit retained jurisdiction.
Golden’s sole appellate contention: the no‑employment provision constitutes an unlawful restraint on the practice of a profession under Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 16600, and because it is a material term the entire settlement is void.
The panel considered (1) whether the dispute is ripe for Article III review and (2) whether § 16600 applies to this kind of no‑employment clause (i.e., whether the district court misapplied California law by limiting § 16600 to traditional non‑compete covenants).

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Ripeness / Article III jurisdiction	Golden: Enforcement decision is ripe because he faces present enforcement of the settlement and will lose current relief if clause is void.	CEP: The clause’s invalidity depends on speculative future events (e.g., CEP acquiring a facility where Golden works), so appeal is unripe.	Court: Traditional ripeness standard applies to private contract enforcement; dispute is ripe because parties have adverse interests and immediate consequences (reversal would reopen the suit).
Applicability of Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 16600 to the no‑employment provision	Golden: §16600 bars any contract that substantially restrains practice of a profession, regardless of label; the clause may substantially restrict his ability to practice and is material, so the whole settlement is void.	CEP/District Court: The clause is not a covenant‑not‑to‑compete; it merely records defendants’ choice not to employ Golden and does not prevent him from competing elsewhere, so §16600 does not apply.	Court: Reversed — district court applied an incorrect, overly narrow rule. §16600’s language and California precedent cover restraints beyond traditional non‑competes; remand for factual development on whether the clause is a restraint of substantial character.

Chamberlain v. Augustine, 172 Cal. 285 (Cal. 1916) (contract imposing liquidated‑damages payment for engaging in business held a substantial restraint and void under predecessor to §16600)
Edwards v. Arthur Andersen LLP, 44 Cal.4th 937 (Cal. 2008) (affirming broad legislative policy favoring employee mobility and rejecting narrow exceptions to §16600)
Principal Life Ins. Co. v. Robinson, 394 F.3d 665 (9th Cir. 2005) (private contract ripeness governed by traditional "substantial controversy" standard; prudential ripeness not applied to private disputes)
O'Neil v. Bunge Corp., 365 F.3d 820 (9th Cir. 2004) (construction and enforcement of settlement agreements governed by state contract law)