05-18-00626-CV
Tex. App.May 14, 2019Background
- Give and Go (Canadian) sued Golden Peanut (Georgia LLC) in Dallas, alleging Golden Peanut supplied weevil-infested pecan pieces that caused product recalls and economic loss.
- Golden Peanut filed a special appearance, asserting it is not a Texas resident and disputing both specific and general personal jurisdiction in Texas.
- Golden Peanut presented undisputed evidence that the contested pecans were shelled and processed at its Camilla, Georgia plant; tracing origin after mixing at the plant was effectively impossible.
- The parties agreed Golden Peanut processed a 1.4 million-pound in-shell batch in Georgia, 34,800 pounds of which came from Texas; Give and Go ordered 20,160 pounds of pecan pieces (roughly 2.88% of the batch by a meat-weight assumption).
- Give and Go argued jurisdiction based on the possibility some of its pecans came from Texas and the effects of the recall in Texas; Golden Peanut argued those contacts were insufficient for specific or general jurisdiction.
- The trial court denied the special appearance without findings; the court of appeals reviewed jurisdiction de novo and reversed, rendering dismissal for lack of jurisdiction.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Waiver of special appearance by discovery/participation | Golden Go argues Golden Peanut waived by moving to compel discovery and objecting to discovery plan | Golden Peanut says those actions were jurisdictional or expressly made "subject to" the special appearance | No waiver: discovery motions were jurisdictional or expressly preserved the special appearance |
| Specific (case‑linked) jurisdiction | Give and Go: Golden Peanut sourced some pecans from Texas; those Texas-sourced pecans could have been in Give and Go’s contaminated lot, creating a substantial connection | Golden Peanut: processing occurred in Georgia; origin became fungible; plaintiff failed to prove the claim arose out of Golden Peanut’s Texas contacts | No specific jurisdiction: the record shows at most de minimis Texas nexus and no substantial connection between Texas contacts and the litigation |
| General (all‑purpose) jurisdiction | Give and Go relied on Golden Peanut’s Texas facilities, employees (~13%), registered agent, and business activity in Texas | Golden Peanut: incorporated and headquartered in Georgia; Texas activities are not so continuous/systematic to render it "at home" in Texas | No general jurisdiction: Golden Peanut is not "at home" in Texas and this is not an exceptional case |
| Reliance on downstream effects (injury in Texas) | Give and Go: injury/effects occurred in Texas (retail sales, FDA recall in Dallas) supporting jurisdiction | Golden Peanut: plaintiff’s downstream distribution or where recall was managed are not defendant-focused contacts with Texas | Held: downstream effects alone do not establish defendant’s contacts with the forum sufficient for jurisdiction |
Key Cases Cited
- Old Republic Nat’l Title Ins. Co. v. Bell, 549 S.W.3d 550 (Tex. 2018) (standard for reviewing special-appearance jurisdictional rulings)
- Moki Mac River Expeditions v. Drugg, 221 S.W.3d 569 (Tex. 2007) (purposeful availment and case-linked jurisdiction framework)
- Kelly v. Gen. Interior Constr., Inc., 301 S.W.3d 653 (Tex. 2010) (burden-shifting on jurisdictional proof; pleadings and evidence scope)
- Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277 (2014) (focus on defendant’s own contacts with the forum, not plaintiff’s contacts or effects)
- BNSF Ry. Co. v. Tyrrell, 137 S. Ct. 1549 (2017) (general jurisdiction ‘‘at home’’ analysis and its demanding nature)
- Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117 (2014) (paradigm forums for general jurisdiction and exceptional-case principle)
- Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017) (limits on specific jurisdiction where forum contacts are not tied to individual claims)
- BMC Software Belgium, N.V. v. Marchand, 83 S.W.3d 789 (Tex. 2002) (implying findings when trial court issues no findings)
- Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945) (foundational minimum-contacts due process principle)
