Gohl ex rel. J.G. v. Livonia Public Schools
134 F. Supp. 3d 1066
E.D. Mich.2015Background
- Plaintiff Lauren Gohl sued on behalf of her son J.G., a 3-year-old special-education student with hydrocephalus and a VP shunt, alleging constitutional violations (Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments), ADA, Rehabilitation Act, and state-law torts for alleged physical and emotional abuse by teacher Sharon Turbiak and failures to act by multiple school employees and Livonia Public Schools (LPS).
- The principal and personnel received complaints in late 2011 about Turbiak’s harsh classroom conduct; Turbiak was counseled and sent home briefly; a November 2011 memorandum warned about professionalism.
- On March 5, 2012, a social worker reported that Turbiak grabbed J.G.’s head and yelled in his face; Turbiak said she placed her hand on his head to prevent bouncing and was returned to class after an initial meeting.
- Records (IEP progress reports and related evaluations) show J.G. received services and made measurable progress on IEP goals during the relevant period.
- Plaintiff proffered expert reports alleging emotional/neurological harm; the court found the psychiatric report unsworn (inadmissible) and the education expert’s opinions conclusory and not tied to J.G.’s specific educational deprivation.
- Procedurally: Defendants moved to dismiss and/or for summary judgment; the court granted summary judgment for defendants on federal statutory and constitutional claims and declined supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims (dismissed without prejudice).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether individual defendants can be sued in their individual capacities under ADA/RA | Gohl argued statutory language permits liability | Defendants: ADA/RA do not impose individual liability for public employees | Dismissed — individual-capacity ADA/RA claims barred (Sixth Circuit precedent) |
| Whether official-capacity ADA/RA claims against individuals are redundant where LPS is sued | Gohl wanted jury to consider individual claims and punitive damages | Defendants: official-capacity claims redundant because LPS is named | Dismissed as redundant — official-capacity claims against employees dismissed; only LPS remains under ADA/RA |
| Whether LPS violated ADA/RA by excluding/denying benefits or discriminating because of disability | Gohl: Turbiak’s alleged abuse deprived J.G. of meaningful education; experts opine harm | LPS: J.G. received services, made progress on IEP; no evidence of exclusion, discrimination, or causation tied to disability | Granted for LPS — no genuine dispute of exclusion, discrimination, or causation; ADA/RA claims dismissed |
| Whether Turbiak’s conduct (and supervisors’ failures) violated constitutional rights (excessive force / substantive due process; equal protection; Monell liability) | Gohl: March 5 incident and alleged pattern constituted conscience-shocking force and discriminatory treatment | Defendants: qualified immunity applies; single incident and lack of severe injury or evidence of disparate treatment; no municipal policy caused violation | Granted for defendants — Fourteenth Amendment substantive-due-process and equal-protection claims fail; qualified immunity; no underlying violation so no Monell liability |
Key Cases Cited
- Albrecht v. Treon, 617 F.3d 890 (6th Cir. 2010) (Rule 12(b)(6) pleading standard described)
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (pleading must state plausible claim; legal conclusions insufficient)
- Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986) (summary judgment burden on movant explained)
- Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986) (summary judgment standard; inferences for nonmoving party)
- Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986) (summary judgment standards regarding inferences)
- Lillard v. Shelby Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 76 F.3d 716 (6th Cir. 1996) (student excessive-force claims assessed under substantive due process "shocks the conscience" standard)
- Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (municipal liability requires policy/custom causation)
- Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001) (qualified immunity two-step inquiry)
- DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989) (not every tort by state actor is a constitutional violation)
