Gohl Ex Rel. J.G. v. Livonia Public Schools School District, 836 F.3d 672

Background

J.G., a medically fragile 3-year-old with hydrocephalus, attended a special-education preschool at Webster Elementary; his mother Lauren Gohl sued on his behalf after alleged mistreatment by teacher Sharon Turbiak.
Multiple staff complaints (Oct 2011–Mar 2012) described rough treatment of lower-functioning students: yelling in faces, force-feeding, grabbing, using makeshift restraints, and other humiliating conduct.
On March 5, 2012 a social worker reported observing Turbiak grab J.G. by the top of his head, jerk it back, and yell in his face; Turbiak said she was performing a ‘‘redirection’’ technique.
The district investigated, placed staff on leave, and ultimately terminated Turbiak (and one paraprofessional) after a broader internal inquiry.
Gohl asserted federal constitutional claims (substantive due process and equal protection under § 1983), ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims against the school district, and municipal liability (Monell); the district court granted summary judgment to defendants; the Sixth Circuit majority affirmed, Judge Clay dissented.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Substantive due process (excessive force) vs. Turbiak	Turbiak’s head‑grab and a pattern of psychological/physical abuse violated J.G.’s Fourteenth Amendment right to be free from excessive force.	The head‑grab was pedagogically justified (redirection), not malicious; no serious injury; conduct did not "shock the conscience."	Affirmed summary judgment for defendants — force was not conscience‑shocking as a matter of law; qualified immunity bars claim about purely psychological bullying.
ADA and Rehabilitation Act (discrimination/denial of benefits) vs. School District	Turbiak’s abuse of lower‑functioning (disabled) students deprived J.G. of educational benefits and was because of his disability.	No admissible evidence that J.G. was denied educational benefits or that actions were caused by disability (no proper comparators or direct evidence of animus).	Affirmed — plaintiff failed to show denial of benefits or but‑for causation required by ADA/504; summary judgment for district.
Equal Protection (disparate treatment)	Disabled students were targeted and treated worse than nondisabled students; that constitutes intentional unequal treatment.	No evidence showing similarly situated nondisabled students were treated differently or that disability was the cause.	Affirmed — no competent evidence of intentional discrimination; claim fails for same reasons as statutory claims.
Municipal liability (Monell)	District policies/practices (or failures to act) were the moving force behind constitutional violations.	No underlying constitutional violation occurred, so Monell claim cannot stand.	Affirmed — no municipal liability because court found no constitutional violation.

Key Cases Cited

County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833 (1998) (“shocks the conscience” standard for executive conduct under Due Process)
Webb v. McCullough, 828 F.2d 1151 (6th Cir. 1987) (students’ right to be free from excessive force; conscience‑shocking inquiry)
Domingo v. Kowalski, 810 F.3d 403 (6th Cir. 2016) (applying multi‑factor test for conscience‑shocking conduct in special‑education context)
Gottlieb v. Laurel Highlands Sch. Dist., 272 F.3d 168 (3d Cir. 2001) (four‑factor approach for force in schools referenced in Domingo)
Monell v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (municipal liability requires policy/custom as moving force)
Ashcroft v. al‑Kidd, 563 U.S. 731 (2011) (qualified immunity requires violation of clearly established right)
Anderson v. City of Blue Ash, 798 F.3d 338 (6th Cir. 2015) (ADA/§504 causation and animus requirements)
G.C. v. Owensboro Pub. Sch., 711 F.3d 623 (6th Cir. 2013) (§504 standard: action taken "solely by reason of" disability)
Monette v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 90 F.3d 1173 (6th Cir. 1996) (applying McDonnell Douglas framework to disability discrimination)
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (burden‑shifting framework for discrimination claims)
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986) (summary judgment standard; view record in non‑movant’s favor)