Goddard v. State
315 Ga. App. 868
| Ga. Ct. App. | 2012Background
- This is Goddard's second appearance; the court vacated and remanded for Barker analysis on constitutional speedy-trial grounds.
- Goddard was arrested December 16, 1992, for robbery and indicted February 19, 1993; separate charges followed in 1993-1994.
- Goddard sought a speedy-trial determination in January 1994; trial notice was mailed to the wrong address, and the February 1994 trial failed to proceed.
- The case was dead-docketed at times, with Goddard in and out of custody in other counties before arrest in March 2010 on the bench warrant.
- On remand, the trial court denied the constitutional speedy-trial plea again; the appellate court vacated and remanded for proper Barker analysis.
- The court held the nearly 19-year pretrial delay triggered Barker analysis and remanded for reassessment with proper factual findings.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Was the delay presumptively prejudicial? | Goddard argues the nearly 19-year delay is presumptively prejudicial. | State contends delay was not presumptively prejudicial due to handling and attribution of delay. | Yes; delay presumptively prejudicial. |
| Did the trial court miscalculate and misweigh Barker factors? | Goddard contends Barker factors were misapplied and not reassessed on remand. | State argues Barker factors were appropriately weighed. | Court must reassess Barker factors on remand. |
| How should delays be attributed between State and defendant? | Goddard asserts State negligence contributed; defendant also had some responsibility but not sole cause. | State argues delays were largely attributable to events beyond defendant's control or actions. | Reassessment required; State negligence weighed significantly. |
| Should the dead-docket period be counted against the defendant? | Dead-docket period should not be counted against Goddard for asserting his rights. | State argues all periods, including dead-docket, may be considered in Barker analysis. | Remand to reevaluate without counting the dead-docket period against Goddard. |
Key Cases Cited
- Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972) (four-factor Barker test governs speedy-trial claims)
- Porter v. State, 288 Ga. 524 (2011) (presumptive prejudice threshold and delay calculation guidance)
- Higgenbottom v. State, 290 Ga. 198 (2011) (presumptive prejudice threshold governs if delay is lengthened)
- Stewart v. State, 310 Ga. App. 551 (2011) (two-stage speedy-trial analysis; appellate review of abuse of discretion)
- Johnson v. State, 313 Ga. App. 895 (2012) (dead-docket and delay attribution considerations in Barker analysis)
- Hayes v. State, 298 Ga. App. 338 (2009) (consideration of defendant's assertion of rights and delay factors)
- White v. State, 282 Ga. 859 (2008) (presumption of prejudice and its weight over time)
- Davis v. State, 308 Ga. App. 843 (2011) (negligence-based delays weighed against the State)
- Hester v. State, 268 Ga. App. 94 (2004) (exceptional delays may create presumption of prejudice)