Glover v. State, 300 Ga. 88

Appellant DeMariye Glover was indicted for malice murder, felony murder, and a firearms offense arising from a robbery in which the victim was killed; co-defendant was the shooter.
On the morning trial was to begin, Glover pleaded guilty to felony murder in exchange for dismissal of the remaining charges and was sentenced to life with parole eligibility.
Within a month, Glover filed a timely pro se motion (and counsel later filed a similar motion) to withdraw the guilty plea, alleging it was not knowing and voluntary and that counsel was ineffective.
At the withdrawal hearing Glover testified he did not understand party liability (he maintained he was not the shooter), but admitted planning and participating in the attempted armed robbery and that the victim was killed during that crime.
Trial counsel testified she had represented Glover for over 11 months, met with him repeatedly, explained party liability and the evidence against him, and was prepared for trial; the plea hearing transcript showed Glover acknowledged waiving rights and accepted the plea knowingly.
The trial court denied the motion to withdraw the plea, finding the plea voluntary and counsel not deficient; the appellate court affirmed.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether guilty plea was knowing and voluntary	Glover: plea was unknowing because he did not understand party liability and thought he was not the shooter	State: plea colloquy, counsel’s testimony, and prosecutor’s factual proffer show Glover understood rights, evidence, and party liability	Held: Plea was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent; denial of motion to withdraw affirmed
Whether counsel provided ineffective assistance causing involuntary plea	Glover: counsel was unprepared, failed to adequately explain law and trial options, forcing plea minutes before trial	State: counsel prepared for trial, met often, explained law and evidence; no deficiency	Held: Credibility resolved for trial court; Glover failed to show deficient performance under Strickland
Standard of review for post-sentencing withdrawal motion	Glover: (implicit) relief required because manifest injustice	State: motion governed by abuse-of-discretion/manifest injustice standard	Held: Motion reviewed for abuse of discretion; withdrawal allowed only to correct manifest injustice; no abuse found
Whether factual basis admitted at plea omitted an element making plea involuntary (Henderson issue)	Glover: (argues lack of understanding of elements)	State: unlike Henderson, elements of felony murder/party liability were encompassed in the plea admissions	Held: Case distinguishable from Henderson; plea admissions covered necessary elements, so plea not involuntary

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (ineffective assistance two-prong test)
Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (application of Strickland to guilty pleas)
Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637 (plea involuntary where plea admissions did not encompass an essential element)
Phelps v. State, 293 Ga. 873 (withdrawal after sentencing: manifest injustice standard)
DeToma v. State, 296 Ga. 90 (valid plea prevents abuse-of-discretion reversal)
McGuyton v. State, 298 Ga. 351 (appeal standard: motion to withdraw plea reviewed for abuse of discretion)
Malone v. State, 321 Ga. App. 803 (trial court resolves credibility when motions to withdraw pleas conflict)