529 P.3d 218
Okla. Crim. App.2023Background
- Richard Eugene Glossip was convicted at a 2004 retrial of first-degree (malice) murder and sentenced to death based on the aggravator that the murder was for remuneration; co-defendant Justin Sneed pled guilty, received life without parole, and testified against Glossip.
- Trial evidence included Sneed's testimony that Glossip paid him to kill the victim, Glossip's inconsistent statements, and recovered cash; Sneed's testimony required corroboration under Oklahoma law.
- Glossip filed multiple post-conviction applications; this is his fifth application based on newly produced prosecutor materials (a recently disclosed "box 8") and affidavits; execution was scheduled for May 18, 2023.
- The Oklahoma Attorney General moved to vacate the conviction and remand for a new trial in its response but disclaimed asserting Glossip's innocence; the AG also joined a joint motion to stay execution pending further review.
- The Court applied the Post-Conviction Procedure Act's strict standards for subsequent applications (22 O.S. § 1089(D)(8)), requiring new, previously unavailable legal or factual bases and clear-and-convincing evidence of actual innocence to overcome procedural bars.
- The Court denied the subsequent application, motions for evidentiary hearing and discovery, and the joint stay of execution, finding the proffered materials cumulative, previously available or non-material, and insufficient to show factual innocence or entitlement to a stay.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Glossip) | Defendant's Argument (State/AG) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Timeliness / procedural-bar for a subsequent post-conviction application | New evidence (materials in box 8) was discovered within 60 days and supports new claims; requests leave to amend | Claims are barred by §1089(D)(8) because the claims were known or could have been developed earlier; amendments treated as subsequent applications | Denied; application is a subsequent filing and most claims are procedurally barred because facts were ascertainable earlier or are cumulative |
| Actual innocence based on new affidavits (Paul Melton; Dr. Peter Speth) | Affidavits supply new, clear-and-convincing evidence undermining guilt and the medical cause-of-death findings | Affidavits are largely cumulative of previous submissions, impeaching not exculpatory, and do not meet the clear-and-convincing standard | Denied; affidavits are not sufficiently new or persuasive to establish factual innocence |
| Brady / Napue claims: alleged suppression of Sneed's mental-health/treatment, Sinclair video, and other prosecutor notes | Prosecution withheld exculpatory/impeachment materials (Sneed's lithium/competency notes; Sinclair videotape; conflicting witness statements and prosecutor notes), and Sneed testified falsely | Many items were known or discoverable earlier; Sneed's lithium use was known to defense; missing video and other items are speculative or non-material under Brady/Napue standards | Denied; evidence was not materially likely to change the outcome and no Napue/Brady violation shown |
| Stay of execution under 22 O.S. §1001.1(C) | Stay needed while new claims and AG review proceed; AG joined in requesting stay | No showing of likelihood of success or irreparable harm as required by statute; no meritorious new claims found | Denied; statutory standard for stay not met and no credible claims found to prevent execution |
Key Cases Cited
- Glossip v. State, 157 P.3d 143 (Okla. Crim. App. 2007) (direct appeal affirming conviction and death sentence)
- Brown v. State, 422 P.3d 155 (Okla. Crim. App. 2018) (standard for Brady materiality in Oklahoma)
- Slaughter v. State, 108 P.3d 1052 (Okla. Crim. App. 2005) (limits on successive post-conviction review; actual innocence exception)
- Valdez v. State, 46 P.3d 703 (Okla. Crim. App. 2002) (discussion of miscarriage-of-justice and procedural bars)
- Lockett v. State, 329 P.3d 755 (Okla. Crim. App. 2014) (statutory standards for stays of execution under §1001.1(C))
- Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333 (1992) (actual innocence standard in capital cases)
- Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 (1993) (actual innocence and miscarriage of justice discussion)
- Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500 (2003) (limitations on successive claims and finality)
- Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959) (defendant's due-process claim where witness testimony is false)
- Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (prosecution's obligation to disclose materially exculpatory evidence)