145 S.Ct. 612
U.S.2025Background
- In 1997 Justin Sneed killed Barry Van Treese; Sneed testified that Richard Glossip paid him to commit the murder. Glossip denied involvement; Sneed was the sole direct witness linking Glossip to the killing.
- Glossip was convicted and sentenced to death in 1998; the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals (OCCA) reversed for ineffective assistance. He was retried in 2004, again convicted and sentenced to death; the OCCA affirmed the second conviction.
- Years of post-conviction litigation and an independent Reed Smith investigation revealed withheld materials and prosecutorial misconduct allegations, including destroyed evidence, withheld witness statements, and notes suggesting prosecutors discussed problematic witness testimony.
- Newly disclosed materials showed Sneed had been diagnosed with bipolar disorder and prescribed lithium by the jail psychiatrist, contradicting his trial testimony that he had never seen a psychiatrist and was given lithium after asking for cold medicine.
- Oklahoma’s attorney general conceded that prosecutors knowingly failed to correct Sneed’s false testimony (a Napue concession) and asked for a new trial; the OCCA denied relief as procedurally barred under Oklahoma’s Post-Conviction Procedures Act (PCPA) and said the concession was “not based in law or fact.”
- The Supreme Court granted certiorari, held it had jurisdiction despite the state procedural ruling, found a Napue violation (prosecutor knowingly allowed false testimony to stand and it was material), reversed the OCCA, and remanded for a new trial.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Glossip) | Defendant's Argument (Oklahoma / OCCA) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Jurisdiction: Can SCOTUS review OCCA judgment given PCPA bar? | OCCA’s PCPA ruling depended on an antecedent federal-law (Napue) ruling, so state ground was not independent. | OCCA relied on independent and adequate PCPA procedural bar; Court lacks jurisdiction. | Court: SCOTUS has jurisdiction because OCCA made application of the PCPA contingent on its federal-law determination of Napue. |
| Napue claim: Did prosecutors knowingly allow or fail to correct false testimony about lithium/psychiatric treatment? | Sneed lied about seeing a psychiatrist and reasons for lithium; prosecutors knew (medical records and prosecutor notes) and failed to correct it. | OCCA: Defense was or should have been aware of lithium; testimony was not clearly false or material. | Court: Conceded Napue error supported by record; prosecutors knew the testimony was false and failure to correct was material—new trial warranted. |
| Materiality: Would correcting the false testimony reasonably likely affect jury verdict? | Because Sneed was the only direct evidence implicating Glossip, correcting his lie would undermine his credibility and the prosecution’s theory. | OCCA/State: Defense knew of Sneed’s condition; any correction would not have changed the outcome; impeachment evidence was already available. | Court: Material—correction would likely have affected jurors’ judgment; cumulative misconduct further undermines confidence. |
| Remedy and procedure: Is immediate remand for new trial appropriate or should state courts decide remaining state-law issues/hearings? | A new trial is the proper remedy for a Napue violation and follows from the concession and record. | Dissent: SCOTUS exceeded its role; OCCA should decide unresolved state-law issues and factual disputes; at minimum remand for evidentiary proceedings. | Court: Reversed and remanded for a new trial; declined to require further state evidentiary proceedings before ordering relief. |
Key Cases Cited
- Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959) (prosecution must correct known false testimony; failure violates due process)
- Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972) (Giglio materiality standard and linkage to Napue principles)
- Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983) (presumption that ambiguous state opinion relied on federal law where not clear)
- United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985) (harmless-error standard and defendant-friendly burden allocation for Brady/related errors)
- Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967) (harmless-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard)
- Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985) (remand/vacatur where state procedural bar depended on antecedent federal-law determination)
- Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991) (independent and adequate state ground doctrine bars federal review)
- Cruz v. Arizona, 598 U.S. 17 (2023) (jurisdictional effect of adequate and independent state grounds)
- Wearry v. Cain, 577 U.S. 385 (2016) (materiality analysis recognizes impeachment already in record does not necessarily render withheld impeachment immaterial)
- Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117 (1945) (limits on Supreme Court review of state court judgments; remedial constraints)