Glickert v. Loop Trolley Transportation Development District
792 F.3d 876
8th Cir.2015Background
- In 2007 University City sought to create the Loop Trolley Transportation Development District (TDD) under Missouri’s TDD Act to fund a trolley project financed by up to a 1% sales tax; the circuit court held formation proceedings, ordered published notice, certified a ballot question, and in 2008 entered a final judgment creating the District and authorizing the tax (the TDD Judgment).
- In 2013 four plaintiffs (Glickert, Jensen, Franklin, Sarandos) sued in federal court seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging the TDD Act’s voting provisions violated equal protection and due process (Count 1) and asserting additional state-law claims (Counts 2–5).
- The district court dismissed Count 1 for Glickert, Jensen, and Franklin for lack of Article III standing, granted summary judgment on Count 1 as to Sarandos on claim-preclusion grounds (he could have intervened in the Formation Lawsuit), and declined supplemental jurisdiction over the state claims.
- On appeal the non-property plaintiffs (Glickert, Jensen, Franklin) argued the court should have allowed amendment to plead standing and that they had standing as nearby residents and frequent patrons; Sarandos argued preclusion could not apply because he lacked constitutionally adequate notice of the Formation Lawsuit.
- The Eighth Circuit affirmed: it held the three non-property plaintiffs lacked prudential standing to assert other voters’ constitutional rights and had not preserved a motion to amend; it also held Sarandos waived his constitutional-notice argument before the district court and affirmed summary judgment precluding his claim.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether district court abused discretion by not allowing amendment to plead standing | Glickert/Jensen/Franklin: court should have permitted amendment because dismissal came early and they could plead particularized facts | District: plaintiffs did not file a motion or proposed amendment; no entitlement to an invitation to amend | No abuse; plaintiffs failed to move or propose an amendment, so denial proper |
| Whether Glickert, Jensen, Franklin have Article III/prudential standing to press equal protection and due process claims | They live near/frequent the District and pay taxes there; thus they are injured by the unconstitutional TDD formation | District: only those who could have voted/whose voting rights were affected have standing to assert these constitutional claims | No standing; their claims assert the rights of third-party voters and thus fail prudential/constitutional standing requirements |
| Whether Sarandos’s claims are precluded by the TDD Judgment (res judicata/collateral estoppel) | Sarandos: he owned property and voted but could not be precluded because he lacked constitutionally adequate notice of the Formation Lawsuit | District: TDD Judgment is final and preclusive; statutory publication notice was provided; Sarandos could have intervened | Affirmed preclusion as applied; Sarandos waived the due-process/notice challenge below and did not rebut evidence that statutory notice was published |
| Whether federal court should exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims after dismissal of federal claim | Plaintiffs: not argued at length on appeal | District: dismissal of federal claim supports declining supplemental jurisdiction | District court properly declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction; state claims dismissed without prejudice |
Key Cases Cited
- Popoalii v. Correctional Med. Servs., 512 F.3d 488 (8th Cir. 2008) (abuse-of-discretion review of denial of leave to amend)
- Wolgin v. Simon, 722 F.2d 389 (8th Cir. 1983) (plaintiff must submit proposed amendment to preserve right to amend)
- Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975) (prudential and constitutional standing principles; cannot assert third-party rights generally)
- Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377 (2014) (Article III standing elements: injury in fact, causation, redressability)
- Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (irreducible constitutional minimum of standing)
- Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461 (1982) (full faith and credit to state-court judgments; due-process limits on preclusion)
- Abbott v. Michigan, 474 F.3d 324 (6th Cir. 2007) (summary judgment on preclusion appropriate when plaintiffs fail to rebut defendants’ evidence of opportunity to litigate)