Glenn Verser v. Jeffrey Barfield, 741 F.3d 734

Inmate Verser sued four prison officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for excessive force during a hunger-strike cell move in September 2007.
Trial occurred in April 2011; Verser was excluded from the courtroom when the verdict was read for security reasons.
The jury returned a verdict for the defendants; a juror later indicated the majority believed all defendants had a part, but there was not enough evidence to find them liable.
Verser moved for a new trial arguing his total exclusion prevented him from polling the jury under Rule 48(c).
The district court denied the new-trial motion, finding Verser was properly excluded and the verdict supported by the evidence.
The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded for a new trial, holding Verser’s Rule 48(c) rights were not adequately protected.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Rule 48(c) requires a poll when a pro se litigant is involuntarily excluded.	Verser, excluded, could not poll the jury.	Exclusion does not require a poll if proper; pre-verdict options exist.	Rule 48(c) rights require protection; court erred by excluding Verser without alternatives.
Whether the exclusion violated Verser’s right to a poll despite proper security reasons.	Exclusion left Verser unable to participate or request a poll.	Exclusion was proper and did not deny a poll.	Exclusion, coupled with inability to communicate, violated Rule 48(c).
Whether the district court’s handling of the verdict and poll request was reversible error.	Failure to permit poll prejudiced Verser and undermined the verdict.	No prejudice shown; poll could have been unnecessary if verdict was unequivocal.	Harmless error not established; error was prejudicial under the circumstances.
Whether Verser forfeited or waived the poll right by not objecting at the time of removal.	Waiver cannot validate denial of a protected right when access is blocked.	Removal timing could have waived rights.	Waiver/ forfeiture does not excuse failure to protect Rule 48(c) rights.
Whether the appropriate remedy is a new trial.	Verser is entitled to a new trial to exercise polling rights.	Remand for limited relief or other measures not necessary.	New trial is warranted; remand for further proceedings.

Humphries v. District of Columbia, 174 U.S. 190 (U.S. 1899) (jury polling to ensure individual assent)
United States v. Shepherd, 576 F.2d 719 (7th Cir. 1978) (juror accountability and polling purpose)
United States v. Sturman, 49 F.3d 1275 (7th Cir. 1995) (polled juries to ensure accuracy of verdict)
United States v. Marr, 428 F.2d 614 (7th Cir. 1970) (pre-verdict polling requests can be abandoned; timing matters)
United States v. Randle, 966 F.2d 1209 (7th Cir. 1992) (insufficient interval for polling after verdict)
United States ex rel. SEC v. Billingsley, 766 F.2d 1015 (7th Cir. 1985) (pre-verdict waiver of polling rights)
Fillippon v. Albion Vein Slate Co., 250 U.S. 76 (U.S. 1919) (trial conduct and presence of parties during proceedings)
Kulas v. Flores, 255 F.3d 780 (9th Cir. 2001) (inmate presence and trial rights considerations)
Vollmer & Co. v. United States, 1 F.3d 1511 (7th Cir. 1993) (harmless error standards in appellate review)