Glenn R. Funk v. Scripps Media, Inc.
570 S.W.3d 205
| Tenn. | 2019Background
- Glenn R. Funk (plaintiff), a district attorney general, sued Scripps Media and reporter Phil Williams for defamation and false-light based on two NewsChannel 5 broadcasts about a state-court lawsuit involving David Chase.
- The broadcasts reported on sealed/under-seal pleadings and a sealed motion referencing a $2,000,000 payment request and a deal conditioned on dismissal of criminal charges.
- Defendants asserted the fair report privilege (reports of official actions/proceedings) and moved for summary judgment; they also invoked Tennessee’s news media shield law to resist discovery of sources and related materials.
- Plaintiff sought discovery to prove malice (to defeat the fair report privilege and, separately, because Funk is a public official and may need to prove actual malice on the merits).
- Trial court ordered limited disclosure of the defendants’ investigative sources; Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) malice does not defeat the fair report privilege and (2) asserting the fair report privilege triggers the shield-law exception only to the extent of identifying the sources relied upon.
- Tennessee Supreme Court granted review to resolve (1) whether malice defeats the fair report privilege and (2) whether asserting that privilege triggers the shield-law source-disclosure exception and, if so, its scope.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does a showing of malice (express or New York Times "actual malice") defeat the fair report privilege? | Express malice (or actual malice as alternative) can defeat the privilege; discovery into malice is relevant. | Neither express malice nor New York Times actual malice defeats the fair report privilege. | Neither express malice nor actual malice defeats the privilege; only unfairness or inaccuracy of the report can defeat it. |
| Is the fair report privilege a "defense based upon the source of the information" that triggers Tenn. Code Ann. § 24-1-208(b) (shield-law exception)? | No; the exception should be limited and not encompass privilege assertions based on official records. | Yes; ‘‘source’’ is broad and includes official actions/proceedings, so asserting the fair report privilege triggers the exception. | Yes; fair report is a source-based defense and triggers the shield-law exception. |
| If the exception is triggered, what may be discovered under § 24-1-208(b)? | Plaintiff sought broad discovery of documents/data backing reports (including the information itself). | Disclosure should be limited to identifying the source(s); not compelled to disclose the underlying information unless § 24-1-208(c)(2) test is met. | Exception permits compelled disclosure of the source (who/what the defendant relied on) but not the underlying information; the plaintiff must satisfy § 24-1-208(c)(2) to obtain the information itself. |
| Did the trial court err in ordering the limited disclosure it ordered? | N/A (trial court granted limited compulsion). | The trial court erred in requiring disclosure beyond what the shield-law exception allows. | Trial court erred; Court of Appeals judgment affirmed on these grounds and case remanded. |
Key Cases Cited
- New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (constitutional "actual malice" standard for public officials)
- Garrison v. State of Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (discussion of need to protect robust debate; distinguishing motive/hatred from constitutional actual malice)
- Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75 (importance of reputation and protection in defamation law)
- Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (press may publish information from official court records without liability)
- Saunders v. Baxter, 53 Tenn. 369 (Tennessee adoption of fair report privilege; historical express-malice language)
- Milligan v. United States, 670 F.3d 686 (6th Cir. applying Tennessee law; discussed by courts as treating actual malice as defeating privilege — Supreme Court rejects that reading)