Glenn Herbert Johnson v. Harris County
01-15-01064-CV
| Tex. App. | Feb 9, 2017Background
- Glenn Herbert Johnson sued multiple Harris County entities and the Harris County Appraisal District (HCAD) asserting common-law torts and inverse condemnation.
- HCAD moved to dismiss based on limitations and doctrines including governmental immunity, collateral estoppel, and res judicata; the trial court granted HCAD’s plea and dismissed HCAD with prejudice on November 25, 2015.
- The Harris County Defendants filed a plea to the jurisdiction and a motion for summary judgment arguing governmental immunity barred tort claims and that limitations/estoppel/res judicata barred other claims; the trial court granted their plea/motion as to tort claims on December 9, 2015, leaving only inverse condemnation claims pending.
- Johnson filed a notice of appeal on March 8, 2016, seeking review of the December 9 Order; the Harris County Defendants moved to dismiss that appeal as untimely.
- The Court of Appeals concluded the December 9 Order was interlocutory but appealable under section 51.014(a)(8) only if the accelerated appeal timetable was met or properly extended; Johnson failed to obtain the trial-court finding required to invoke Rule 306a tolling, and his March 8 notice was untimely.
- The court granted the motion to dismiss Johnson’s appeal as to the Harris County Defendants; Johnson’s appeal of the November 25 order dismissing HCAD remains pending.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the December 9, 2015 order is appealable despite being interlocutory | Johnson contends lack of timely notice of the order extended appeal time under Rule 306a | Harris County Defendants assert the appeal deadline expired and no tolling was obtained | Court: Order was interlocutory but appealable under §51.014(a)(8); however appeal was untimely because Rule 306a tolling was not shown |
| Whether Rule 306a extended the appellate deadline | Johnson argues clerk’s failure to mail notice delayed his knowledge, so Rule 306a applies | Defendants contend Johnson did not obtain the required trial-court finding proving delayed notice | Court: Johnson did not file the sworn motion/obtain the written trial-court finding required by Rule 306a, so no extension applied |
| Whether an accelerated appeal deadline may be extended by filing within the 15-day Rule 26.3 window | Johnson impliedly relies on equitable or relation-back doctrines to perfect appeal | Defendants maintain strict accelerated deadlines apply absent proper extension | Court: Accelerated deadlines are strict; rule 26.3 extension requires timely motion or implied extension; none cured the late filing here |
| Whether the March 8, 2016 notice could be treated as amending a separate timely notice (relation back) | Johnson effectively attempts to rely on his timely appeal of the November 25 order to perfect appeal of December 9 order | Defendants argue separate interlocutory orders cannot be amended to add a different order | Court: Notices do not relate back to permit appeal of a different interlocutory order; March 8 notice did not perfect appeal of December 9 order |
Key Cases Cited
- Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191 (Texas 2001) (final-judgment requirement for appellate jurisdiction)
- N.E. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Aldridge, 400 S.W.2d 893 (Tex. 1966) (finality requires disposal of all parties and issues)
- Stary v. DeBord, 967 S.W.2d 352 (Tex. 1998) (statutory authorization required for interlocutory appeals)
- Thomas v. Long, 207 S.W.3d 334 (Tex. 2006) (plea to the jurisdiction appeals allowed irrespective of procedural vehicle)
- In re K.A.F., 160 S.W.3d 923 (Tex. 2005) (strict deadlines for accelerated appeals)
- Verburgt v. Dorner, 959 S.W.2d 615 (Tex. 1997) (implied motion for extension when notice filed in 15-day extension window)
- Pilot Travel Ctrs., LLC v. McCray, 416 S.W.3d 168 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2013) (Rule 306a may extend appeal deadline if procedural prerequisites met)
- Moore Landrey, L.L.P. v. Hirsch & Westheimer, P.C., 126 S.W.3d 536 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2003) (trial-court written finding required to invoke Rule 306a tolling)
- Cantu v. Longoria, 878 S.W.2d 131 (Tex. 1994) (requirements for extending appellate deadlines based on delayed notice)
- Brown Mech. Servs., Inc. v. Mountbatten Sur. Co., 377 S.W.3d 40 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2012) (failure to obtain Rule 306a finding defeats claim of extended appeal period)
