Glenn A. Griffin v. Cristie J. Griffin, 2014 ME 70

Background

Glenn and Cristie Griffin divorced; dispute over primary residence and telephone contact with their then-six-year-old daughter.
Interim order (Aug 2012) granted Glenn primary residence and allowed both parents reasonable telephone contact; prohibited disparaging statements to the child.
Glenn overheard Cristie making disparaging and emotionally harmful remarks to the child on nightly calls; he recorded four of those calls using a smartphone/Bluetooth recorder in Nov 2012. Cristie also made recordings of some calls.
Cristie moved in limine to exclude Glenn’s recordings under Maine’s Interception of Wire and Oral Communications Act (15 M.R.S. §§ 709–713), arguing they were unlawfully intercepted and thus inadmissible; the court denied the motion and admitted the recordings at trial.
The court found Cristie in contempt for disparaging the father, awarded primary residence to Glenn, restricted Cristie’s contact, and conditioned post-judgment contact on counseling approved by the guardian ad litem (GAL).
The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed admission of Glenn’s recordings under a vicarious-consent doctrine but vacated the portion of the judgment that required the GAL to approve Cristie’s post-judgment counselor (because GAL authority ended with the final judgment).

Issues

Issue	Griffin (appellant) argument	Griffin (appellee) argument	Held
Admissibility of Glenn’s recordings under Maine’s Interception Act	Recordings were intercepted without consent of either party or the child; inadmissible under 15 M.R.S. § 713	Glenn had authority to record: he vicariously consented on child’s behalf because recordings were necessary and in child’s best interest	Court: Parent may vicariously consent for a minor child if the parent has a good‑faith, objectively reasonable belief that recording is necessary and in the child’s best interests; Glenn met that standard, so recordings admissible
Whether a parent can give prior authority on behalf of a minor under 15 M.R.S. § 709(4)(C)	No statutory authorization; child’s consent required and a parent’s recording violates privacy statute	Vicarious consent is consistent with parental duty to protect children and other jurisdictions’ interpretations	Court: Statute allows vicarious consent in these circumstances; adopted good‑faith/ objectively reasonable-best-interest test
Sufficiency/authenticity of recordings and GAL report reliance	Recordings were incomplete/unauthenticated; GAL report improperly relied on illegal evidence	Recordings reflected what Glenn had overheard and were corroborated; GAL performed extensive investigation	Court: Recordings were properly admitted and authenticated; GAL’s work was sufficient; reliance permissible
GAL authority to approve post-judgment counselor and fees allocation	GAL lacked authority after final judgment; court erred by extending GAL duties post-judgment; fee allocation lacked findings of reasonableness/ability to pay	Appointment order limited GAL to "duration of the case"; GAL had been heavily involved; court ordered GAL approval to ensure appropriate counseling	Court: Vacated the portion ordering GAL to approve Cristie’s post-judgment counselor (GAL appointment ended with final judgment). All other rulings, including fee allocation and other orders, affirmed

Key Cases Cited

Kehling v. State, 601 A.2d 620 (Me. 1991) (interpreting consent/ interception provisions under prior law)
Pollock v. Pollock, 154 F.3d 601 (6th Cir. 1998) (parent may vicariously consent for minor child when in child’s best interest; good‑faith/objective standard)
State v. Spencer, 737 N.W.2d 124 (Iowa 2007) (adopts vicarious consent doctrine in custody context; analyzes best‑interest requirement)
State v. Whitner, 732 S.E.2d 861 (S.C. 2012) (discusses parent vicarious consent and privacy expectations; collects authority)
Campbell v. Price, 2 F. Supp. 2d 1186 (E.D. Ark. 1998) (father’s recording of daughter’s calls justified by good‑faith concern for child’s welfare)