Glen Murphy v. Aldolfo C. Dulay
768 F.3d 1360
11th Cir.2014Background
- Murphy, a Florida resident, seeks to sue Dr. Dulay for medical negligence in state court after presuit requirements.
- Florida § 766.106 requires 90-day presuit notice, a medical expert opinion, and various disclosures including an authorization form for release of protected health information.
- Section 766.1065 adds a mandatory HIPAA-compliant authorization to accompany the presuit notice, permitting ex parte interviews and broad disclosure to the defense.
- Murphy worried signing the form would invade privacy via ex parte interviews; he filed suit in federal court seeking a declaration of HIPAA preemption and injunction against § 766.1065.
- The district court held § 766.1065 preempted by HIPAA; the Eleventh Circuit reversed, concluding no preemption.
- This court reviews de novo whether a federal preemption claim is sustained and evaluates HIPAA’s express preemption and regulatory framework.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does § 766.1065 conflict with HIPAA such that express preemption applies? | Murphy argues HIPAA § 164.508/164.512 preempts the Florida form. | Dulay/Florida contend § 766.1065 aligns with HIPAA and is not an obstacle to HIPAA’s goals. | Not contrary; no express preemption. |
| Does § 766.1065's presuit authorization meet HIPAA’s valid-authorization requirements? | Murphy claims the form fails HIPAA elements and is overly broad. | Dulay argues the form satisfies HIPAA’s required elements and purposes. | Yes; the form complies with HIPAA requirements. |
| Is § 766.1065's authorization coercive or involuntary in violation of HIPAA voluntariness? | Murphy asserts conditioning on signing is coercive and violates voluntariness. | Dulay asserts the authorization may be conditioned and that choice to file suit remains voluntary. | Not contrary; conditioning is permissible under HIPAA. |
| Does § 766.1065 create a prohibited compound authorization by linking to presuit notice? | Murphy contends combining presuit notice with the authorization creates an impermissible compound authorization. | Dulay argues presuit notice is not a legal permission and thus not a compound authorization. | Not a compound authorization; permissible with a separate presuit notice. |
| Would preemption be supported by treating Florida’s statute as an obstacle to HIPAA’s purposes? | Murphy claims the statute undermines HIPAA privacy goals. | Dulay claims § 766.1065 furthers HIPAA’s goals by facilitating efficient investigation and resolution. | Not contrary; statute advances HIPAA objectives and preserves privacy and efficiency. |
Key Cases Cited
- OPIS Mgmt. Res., LLC v. Sec’y, Fla. A. for Health Care Admin., 713 F.3d 1291 (11th Cir. 2013) (explains preemption framework and against presumption against preemption in health matters)
- PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567 (U.S. 2011) (explicit preemption analysis; impossible to comply with both state and federal requirements)
- Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (U.S. 1996) (presumption against preemption in areas traditionally regulated by states)
- In re Collins, 286 S.W.3d 911 (Tex. 2009) (upheld HIPAA-compliant precondition to filing suit; conflict not shown)
- Stevens ex rel. Stevens v. Hickman Comm. Health Care Servs., Inc., 418 S.W.3d 547 (Tenn. 2013) (state statute requiring HIPAA authorization for suit affirmed as voluntary choice)