Glaze v. J.K. Williams, LLC, 439 P.3d 920

Timmy Glaze filed a workers' compensation application for hearing on Dec. 5, 2012, alleging a work-related fall.
Employer J.K. Williams moved to dismiss for lack of prosecution on Jan. 4, 2016 under K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 44-523(f)(1) after no hearing/settlement occurred within three years.
Glaze filed a "request for extension" on Jan. 29, 2016, asserting delay in taking an out-of-state deposition and that he had not reached maximum medical improvement (MMI).
The ALJ dismissed the claim, ruling that the statute requires a motion for extension to be filed within three years of the application for hearing.
The Board (3–1) and the Kansas Court of Appeals affirmed; the Kansas Supreme Court granted review of statutory interpretation issues and affirmed the Court of Appeals.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 44-523(f)(1) requires a claimant to file a motion to extend within three years of filing an application for hearing	Glaze: the three-year limit applies only to the conclusive presumption of good cause (i.e., presumption applies if motion to extend is timely for MMI claims); ALJ may still grant extensions after 3 years when good cause shown	Employer: the statute makes the three-year period a time bar to filing a motion to extend; an ALJ may grant an extension only if the motion was filed prior to the three-year deadline	The Court held the statute unambiguously requires a motion to extend be filed within three years of the application for hearing; affirmed dismissal.

Bryant v. Midwest Staff Solutions, Inc., 292 Kan. 585, 257 P.3d 255 (2011) (standard of review for statutory interpretation)
Ambrosier v. Brownback, 304 Kan. 907, 375 P.3d 1007 (2016) (when statutory language is clear, court gives effect to plain words)
Petty v. City of El Dorado, 270 Kan. 847, 19 P.3d 167 (2001) (statute ambiguous when two or more interpretations fairly possible)
State v. Gensler, 308 Kan. 674, 423 P.3d 488 (2018) (plain legislative language is primary tool for divining intent)
State v. Spencer Gifts, 304 Kan. 755, 374 P.3d 680 (2016) (caution against courts imposing policy preferences over legislative text)
Ullery v. Othick, 304 Kan. 405, 372 P.3d 1135 (2016) (reluctance to add or subtract statutory language)
Godsoe v. Harder, 164 Kan. 86, 187 P.2d 515 (1947) (punctuation and grammar are aids but not controlling when they conflict with clear legislative intent)
Castleman v. Internet Money Ltd., 546 S.W.3d 684 (Tex. 2018) (punctuation can indicate meaning but does not override reason and context)